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This paper continues a wider debate about the interpretation and operationalisation of  
s 96 of the Australian Constitution. That debate began in this journal over 30 years ago 
with the critical analysis of the orthodox interpretation of the section by Cheryl Saunders. 
Despite this, and recent political controversies about the use of s 96 by the 
Commonwealth, there is yet to be a direct constitutional assault on the orthodox 
interpretation of the provision. However, there has been increasing incidental 
consideration of the section as a result of greater scrutiny on the financial provisions of  
ch IV of the Australian Constitution. This jurisprudence significantly advances our 
understanding of the role and function of s 96 and assists us to resolve many of the 
outstanding questions first raised here. This paper will explore that jurisprudence and 
suggest an approach to the section that ensures it can operate within the constitutional 
system of federal fiscalism, rather than outside of it. 
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I   I N T R O D U C T IO N 
The Australian Constitution (the ‘Constitution’) is renowned for its stability 
and, for some, its tenacious resistance to change; a metaphorical ‘frozen 
continent’.1 Yet, that only represents part of the picture, one which defines 
reform in hard terms.2 Australia’s constitutional landscape has been 
dramatically altered by soft power influences since federation;3 not least  
by judicial means. Indeed, High Court jurisprudence has produced  
tectonic shifts in the constitutional landscape since federation.4 The Court’s 
 
 1 Geoffrey Sawer, Australian Federalism in the Courts (Melbourne University Press, 1967) 208. 
 2 That is, the formal referendum process envisioned by s 128 of the Constitution. 
 3 For instance, through: the exercise of financial and tax powers; the ratification of treaties by 
the Commonwealth to extend its powers; executive federalism; cooperative governance and 
intergovernmental relations; and consequential structural interdependence alongside the 
increasingly national focus of press and party politics as part of Australia’s development as a 
nation within the international community: see Kenneth Wiltshire, ‘Reforming Australian 
Governance: Old States, No States or New States?’ in AJ Brown and JA Bellamy (eds), 
Federalism and Regionalism in Australia: New Approaches, New Institutions? (ANU Press, 
2007) 185, 188–93. For a discussion about the ways in which the constitutional arrangements 
have changed since 1901, see Andrew Lynch and George Williams, ‘Beyond a Federal 
Structure: Is a Constitutional Commitment to a Federal Relationship Possible?’ (2008) 31(2) 
University of New South Wales Law Journal 395. 
 4 See, eg, Amalgamated Society of Engineers v Adelaide Steamship Co Ltd (1920) 28 CLR 129 
(‘Engineers’ Case’); R v Kirby; Ex parte Boilermakers’ Society of Australia (1956) 94 CLR 254; 
Commonwealth v Tasmania (1983) 158 CLR 1 (‘Tasmanian Dam Case’); Mabo v Queensland 
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early interpretation of s 96 of the Constitution is a particularly striking 
example of this.5 
Section 96 was a last-minute addition to the Constitution, subject to little 
debate or consideration.6 While apparently intended to be a transitional 
provision, the Commonwealth quickly seized upon it as a source of financial 
influence over the states, something that has continued to this day.7 That is  
the result of early High Court formalism, which ignored the provision’s 
history, purpose and constitutional context.8 The result of this orthodoxy  
was to metaphorically cut the provision adrift from the remainder of  
the constitutional continent. Practically, it contributed to a federal fiscal 
imbalance in favour of the Commonwealth, from which the states have  
never recovered. 
Constitutional scholars have argued for some decades now that the early 
interpretation of s 96 as a largely unbounded provision ‘unaffected by … any 
other provision of the Constitution’9 (commonly described as the ‘orthodox 
interpretation’) is erroneous and cannot be sustained.10 Most notable is the 
work of Cheryl Saunders, who wrote a two-part treatise on the section in this 
journal some 30 years ago.11 The first of those papers highlighted ‘flaws in the 
form and conception of s 96’ and ‘uncertainty and confusion in the case law’ 
arising from ambiguities in its wording,12 as well as ‘discrepancies between it 
and the scheme of the rest of the Constitution’.13 Saunders highlighted a series 
of fundamental problems and questions that arose from the orthodoxy 
 
[No 2] (1992) 175 CLR; Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1997) 189 CLR 520; 
New South Wales v Commonwealth (2006) 229 CLR 1 (‘Work Choices Case’). 
 5 See below nn 32–40 and accompanying text. 
 6 Greg Taylor, ‘On the Origin of Section 96 of the Constitution’ (2016) 39(4) University of New 
South Wales Law Journal 1438, 1438–9. 
 7 See Jonathan Crowe and Peta Stephenson, ‘Reimagining Fiscal Federalism: Section 96 as a 
Transitional Provision’ (2014) 33(1) University of Queensland Law Journal 221, 221–2. 
 8 See, eg, Victoria v Commonwealth (1926) 38 CLR 399 (‘Federal Roads Case’). See also below 
nn 35–7 and accompanying text. 
 9 Deputy Federal Commissioner of Taxation (NSW) v W R Moran Pty Ltd (1939) 61 CLR 735, 
771 (‘Flour Tax Case’). 
 10 See, eg, David Hume, Andrew Lynch and George Williams, ‘Heresy in the High Court? 
Federalism as a Constraint on Commonwealth Power’ (2013) 41(1) Federal Law Review 71; 
Taylor (n 6). 
 11 Cheryl Saunders, ‘Towards a Theory for Section 96’ (Pt 1) (1987) 16(1) Melbourne University 
Law Review 1 (‘Part 1’); Cheryl Saunders, ‘Towards a Theory for Section 96’ (Pt 2) (1988) 
16(4) Melbourne University Law Review 699 (‘Part 2’). 
 12 Saunders, ‘Part 1’ (n 11) 31. 
 13 Ibid 5. 
458 Melbourne University Law Review [Vol 42(2):455 
surrounding s 96 which ‘have not yet directly been considered by the High 
Court’, arguing that the ‘situation is unlikely to last’.14 
Despite others echoing Saunders’ dissatisfaction with the orthodox 
interpretation of s 96,15 there has been no direct constitutional assault on the 
section nor systematic review of it by the Court in subsequent decades. The 
vacuum has allowed the Commonwealth to construct increasingly liberal s 96 
schemes, which treat the states largely as conduits of Commonwealth 
spending on matters lying outside the limits of its legislative power.16 
That said, while s 96 has remained (directly) untouched, the Court has 
been busily reconstructing the constitutional landscape around it. This 
change, and particularly the new understanding of the federal financial 
arrangements of ch IV — in which s 96 is found — give us a much better 
understanding of the role, place and function of the provision within the 
Constitution. The result is that we are better able to answer the questions 
raised by Saunders three decades ago. 
This paper tracks that jurisprudence to consider the proper interpretation 
of the section. It does so as follows: 
• Part II will provide an historic overview of the section and the orthodoxy 
which developed around it; 
• Part III will discuss how the Court has worked to restructure ch IV 
through the federal fiscal cases, which has resulted in s 96 being 
reintegrated into the constitutional landscape. The result is a new 
understanding of the purpose and function of the section; 
• Part IV will consider the implications of that newly (re)discovered purpose 
and function for the orthodox interpretation; and 
 
 14 Ibid 14. 
 15 Stephen McLeish, ‘Federal Implications under the Australian Constitution’ (2012) 25(3) 
Public Law Review 172, 183–4; Shipra Chordia, ‘Section 96 of the Constitution: 
Developments in Methodology and Interpretation’ (2015) 34(2) University of Tasmania Law 
Review 54. 
 16 See, eg, Northern Australia Infrastructure Facility Act 2016 (Cth), discussed below Part II(B) 
(‘NAIF Act’); the funding scheme under the Schools Assistance Act 2008 (Cth) and Australian 
Education Act 2013 (Cth), discussed in Hoxton Park Residents Action Group Inc v Liverpool 
City Council (2016) 310 FLR 193; National Water Commission Act 2004 (Cth), discussed in 
ICM Agriculture Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (2009) 240 CLR 140 (‘ICM Agriculture’). See also 
Senator Leyonjhelm’s motion concerning the delegation of s 96 grants authority to Ministers 
in annual appropriations: Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 23 June 2015, 
4265–7; Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 17 March 2016, 2709. 
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• Part V turns the analysis to remapping the proper function of the section 
as an essential part of ch IV and a fundamental fixture of the constitutional 
landscape, rather than something cut adrift from it. 
In sum, interpreting s 96 contextually within, rather than outside, the 
constitutional framework brings into sharp relief two fundamental flaws with 
the orthodox interpretation of the provision. The first is that the section has 
been incorrectly treated as a legislative power to spend. The second, 
consequential, assumption is that the section is unbounded and capable of 
executive delegation. Such assumptions cannot be sustained in a federal 
system underpinned by representative and responsible government and the 
rule of law. 
Section 96 is essentially a conduit through which cooperative federal 
fiscalism is to be achieved; specifically, by describing the process by which 
public monies are to be transferred from one constitutional polity to another. 
Both of those polities are established by the Constitution,17 and both are 
limited by its essential imperatives and conventions.18 These include the 
fundamental rule of representative and responsible government that public 
income and expenditure is supervised by Parliament, and not used for 
unauthorised purposes.19 In the case of tied grants, this necessarily means that 
Parliaments of both polities authorise not only the transfer of public monies, 
but more essentially the purposes to which they are put, to ensure they are 
limited to constitutional boundaries. This is also evident when the provision is 
read within the context of the financial chapter in which it is found; namely, in 
a way which strengthens, rather than weakens, its free trade and anti-
preference guarantees. While the role of the Senate as the state’s House may 
be ‘vestigial’,20 it was designed to act as a check and balance on the misuse of 
central power to preference some regions over others. Thus, Senate oversight 
is an essential feature, and condition precedent, to the authorisation of 
individual tied grants, and the terms and conditions to which they are put. As 
will be seen, this is evident in the wording of the provision, its context within 
 
 17 Constitution ss 1, 107. 
 18 See, eg, ibid ss 2, 5, 28, 61–70, 75. In respect of the reception of constitutional conventions 
into the colonies, and later into the states and the Commonwealth, see Egan v Willis (1998) 
195 CLR 424; Egan v Chadwick (1999) 46 NSWLR 563. 
 19 See Northern Suburbs General Cemetery Reserve Trust v Commonwealth (‘Cemetery Reserve 
Case’) (1993) 176 CLR 555, 572 (Mason CJ, Deane, Toohey and Gaudron JJ), 593 (Dawson J), 
599 (McHugh J). 
 20 Williams v Commonwealth (2012) 248 CLR 156, 205 [61] (French CJ) (‘Williams [No 1]’). 
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the Constitution, and the wider principles of federal fiscalism, the rule of law 
and representative and responsible government that underpin it. 
II   A  SH O RT  HI S T O RY  O F  S  96 
Section 96 of the Constitution states as follows: 
During a period of ten years after the establishment of the Commonwealth and 
thereafter until the Parliament otherwise provides, the Parliament may grant 
financial assistance to any State on such terms and conditions as the Parliament 
thinks fit. 
The history of this provision, both in respect of its drafting and its 
interpretation by the High Court, has been dealt with comprehensively 
elsewhere.21 Most notably, in Cheryl Saunders’ two-part study22 and, more 
recently, in Greg Taylor’s historical investigations into the rather nebulous 
origins of the section23 and in Shipra Chordia’s review of the shifting 
approaches to its interpretation.24 This paper will draw on those works, rather 
than repeat them in any detail. Suffice to say, it is now well accepted that s 96 
was added at the last minute to the constitutional draft as a ‘political 
compromise’, designed to ensure federation by allaying concerns of the states 
that the restructuring of fiscal relations might make the smaller ones 
vulnerable to insolvency.25 
As Quick and Garran explained in 1901, the understanding of the State 
Premiers immediately prior to federation was that (the then proposed) s 96 
was ‘not intended to be used, and ought not to be used, except in cases of 
emergency’.26 Such emergencies were understood to be limited to the 
uncertain period of national financial restructuring that followed federation. 
 
 21 See, eg, Saunders, ‘Part 1’ (n 11); Saunders, ‘Part 2’ (n 11); Taylor (n 6); Crowe and 
Stephenson (n 7); Chordia (n 15). See also Brendan Gogarty, ‘Australia’s $1 Billion Loan to 
Adani is Ripe for a High Court Challenge’, The Conversation (online, 4 October 2017) 
<https://theconversation.com/australias-1-billion-loan-to-adani-is-ripe-for-a-high-court-cha 
llenge-85077>, archived at <https://perma.cc/WT6C-Q8SZ>. 
 22 Saunders, ‘Part 1’ (n 11); Saunders, ‘Part 2’ (n 11). 
 23 Taylor (n 6). 
 24 Chordia (n 15). 
 25 Saunders, ‘Part 1’ (n 11) 4. See also Taylor (n 6) 1442. 
 26 John Quick and Robert Randolph Garran, The Annotated Constitution of the Australian 
Commonwealth (Angus & Robertson, 1901) 870. 
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Hence, Sir James Dickson, the ‘protagonist’ behind the drafting and inclusion 
of s 96 in the Constitution,27 summarised its purpose as follows: 
Before the coming into operation of uniform duties of customs and excise, 
adequate provision shall be made by a law, or laws, of the Commonwealth for 
indemnifying the states against any loss that they may severally sustain by 
reason of the establishment of the Commonwealth, and the coming into 
operation of such uniform duties.28 
As with other transitional provisions, it was assumed that s 96 would diminish 
in importance, if not fall into desuetude, once federal restructuring was 
complete.29 Consequently, little attention was given to it or how it might 
interact with the other parts of the Constitution.30 
The drafting history of the section was forgotten — or, perhaps more 
appropriately, ignored — by the formalist High Court after Amalgamated 
Society of Engineers v Adelaide Steamship Co Ltd (‘Engineers’ Case’).31 In 
Victoria v Commonwealth (‘Federal Roads Case’),32 the Court gave short shrift 
to contextual and originalist arguments about the section. The legislation in 
contest involved a tied funding scheme authorising the construction and 
maintenance of roads. In a three-line judgment, the High Court determined 
that the Federal Aid Roads Act 1926 (Cth) was valid, stating: 
The Court is of opinion that the [impugned] Federal Aid Roads Act No 46 of 
1926 is a valid enactment. 
It is plainly warranted by the provisions of [s] 96 of the Constitution, and 
not affected by those of [s] 99 or any other provisions of the Constitution, so 
that exposition is unnecessary. 
The action is dismissed.33 
 
 27 Taylor (n 6) 1442. 
 28 Official Record of the Debates of the Federal Council of Australasia, Melbourne, 25 January 
1899, 19 (Sir James Dickson). 
 29 Crowe and Stephenson (n 7) 222–4. Even post-Engineers’ Case (n 4) judges like Evatt J 
recognised that the provision was not intended to last. As Evatt J stated: ‘The words in [s] 96 
are verbatim the same as those in [s] 87, and perhaps the court should take judicial notice of 
the fact that the two sections were closely associated with each other and may well have been 
intended to stand together and terminate together’: Flour Tax Case (n 9) 803. 
 30 Saunders, ‘Part 2’ (n 11) 699. 
 31 Engineers’ Case (n 4). 
 32 Federal Roads Case (n 8). 
 33 Ibid 406 (Knox CJ). 
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That is the entirety of the per curiam judgment. Indeed, it is arguably a 
decision per incuriam, insofar as it lacks any articulated description or 
reasoning. Despite this, it was relied upon by the post-Engineers’ Case Court 
as an apparent source of precedential authority. Indeed, just over a decade 
later, in the 1939 case Deputy Federal Commissioner of Taxation (NSW) v W R 
Moran Pty Ltd (‘Flour Tax Case’),34 Latham CJ cited the Federal Roads Case as 
authority for the fact that s 96 was ‘unaffected by [s] 99 or any other provision 
of the Constitution’,35 not in relation to any one piece of legislation, but 
generally.36 His Honour further concluded that 
Parliament has the fullest power of fixing the terms and conditions of any grant 
made under the section. Parliament does fix the terms and conditions of the 
grant if, by legislation, it authorizes a Minister to determine such terms and 
conditions.37 
As will be discussed below, this dictum is now questionable; arguably, it 
always was. Nevertheless, Latham CJ’s statement became the basis of an 
accepted orthodoxy which treated s 96 as an unreviewable island of 
Commonwealth spending power. Hence, in Victoria v Commonwealth 
(‘Second Uniform Tax Case’), Dixon CJ noted that 
while others asked where the limits of what could be done in virtue of the 
power the section conferred were to be drawn, the Court has said that none are 
drawn; that any enactment is valid if it can be brought within the literal 
meaning of the words of the section and as to the words ‘financial assistance’ 
even that is unnecessary. For it may be said that a very extended meaning has 
been given to the words ‘grant financial assistance to any State’ and that they 
have received an application beyond that suggested by a literal interpretation.38 
Indeed, while the orthodoxy has often been described as the product of 
literalism, his Honour was quite correct to point out that the orthodox 
 
 34 This case related to a cooperative scheme to federally regulate the national wheat market. 
Flour millers were taxed by the Commonwealth, with the proceeds paid to wheat growers in 
each state through the conduit of a s 96 tied grant to each state government. Given no wheat 
was grown in Tasmania at the time, special provisions had to be made to reimburse 
Tasmanian millers in a different manner than provided in the other states. This was done by a 
separate s 96 tied grant to the Tasmanian Government. The plaintiff argued that this 
discriminated between states (under Constitution ss 51(ii)–(iii)): Flour Tax Case (n 9). 
 35 Ibid 771. 
 36 Ibid 758. 
 37 Ibid 763. 
 38 (1957) 99 CLR 575, 611 (‘Second Uniform Tax Case’). 
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interpretation goes beyond literalism to apparently ignore the plain meaning 
of the words. This will be discussed further below.39 Suffice to say, it is 
probably better to ascribe the orthodoxy to the formalistic tendency of the 
post-Engineers’ Case Court to ignore originalist or contextual considerations 
in their interpretation of the Constitution. This was accepted by Dixon CJ, 
who concluded: 
It may well be that s 96 was conceived by the framers as (1) a transitional 
power, (2) confined to supplementing the resources of the Treasury of a State by 
particular subventions when some special or particular need or occasion arose, 
and (3) imposing terms or conditions relevant to the situation which called for 
special relief of assistance from the Commonwealth. It seems a not improbable 
supposition that the framers had some such conception of the purpose of the 
power. But the course of judicial decision has put any such limited 
interpretation of s 96 out of consideration.40 
Thus, the Chief Justice reluctantly joined the majority in embedding the 
orthodox view of s 96, although on the narrow point of state consent to the 
terms and conditions of the grant. The consequence was to make the section 
seem like it has ‘no judicially enforceable limits’.41 
That said, some caution should be exercised regarding just how much 
South Australia v Commonwealth (‘First Uniform Tax Case’)42 and the Second 
Uniform Tax Case actually amount to a true enlargement of the orthodoxy. 
While they are often viewed as s 96 cases, they only deal with the provision in 
a narrow, incidental way — so their precedential value is limited.43 The 
 
 39 See below Part IV. 
 40 Second Uniform Tax Case (n 38) 609. 
 41 Tony Blackshield and George Williams, Australian Constitutional Law and Theory 
(Federation Press, 5th ed, 2010) 1085. 
 42 (1942) 65 CLR 373 (‘First Uniform Tax Case’). 
 43 These cases — which are related to nearly identical legislation made during and shortly after 
World War II — are commonly viewed as s 96 cases, even though the actual dispute related to 
the amount of income tax the Commonwealth can collect. In most federal constitutional 
frameworks, income tax is collected in relatively equal measure by state and federal 
governments. This was the case in Australia until World War II, when the Commonwealth 
doubled its income tax to support the war effort (ibid) and continued to do this after the war 
had finished (Second Uniform Tax Case (n 38)). No state could politically afford to continue 
to tax its citizens on top of the Commonwealth tax. Instead, the Commonwealth agreed to 
pay the amount of income tax it did not use back to the states, but on the condition (under  
s 96) that the recipient states did not levy their own income tax. The states challenged the 
framework on the grounds that it functionally placed them in a position where they were 
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primary question in those cases was, in fact, whether the Commonwealth 
could levy an unequal share of income tax to the states. The secondary 
question was whether it could use this unequal share to pressure the states 
into agreeing to the terms and conditions of s 96 grants. The majority 
considered the answer to both questions to be in the affirmative, albeit with 
the caveat that the state had to legally agree to the terms and conditions. 
However, the Court, believing itself bound to the earlier orthodox decisions 
and still firmly gripped by post-Engineers’ Case formalism, refused to look 
behind the question of technical legal consent. The result is that the 
Commonwealth can use its financial and political supremacy to ‘induce’ state 
compliance.44 It can also set terms and conditions that effectively extend the 
Commonwealth’s influence beyond its enumerated heads of legislative 
power.45 This was entirely beyond what the section was intended for. As 
Taylor concludes in his historical review of the drafting of the section: 
Perhaps the most remarkable and currently relevant point is that virtually 
everyone — from Griffith CJ to (Sir) James Dickson down to the humblest 
country newspaper — assumed that section 96 would be about money and 
solvency. There is no sign of any expectation that the ‘terms and conditions’ 
which it authorises would be anything other than ancillary to the grant of 
money, rather than, as with some tied grants since 1901, of equal or even 
greater importance.46 
Nor was there much expectation about the profound distortions to the federal 
balance that would ensue from the wide ranging and near unfettered use of  
s 96. This has served as one of the primary catalysts of a federal vertical fiscal 
imbalance, in which the states have been placed at the financial mercy of the 
Commonwealth.47 The more financially vulnerable the states became, the 
 
forced, under economic duress, to agree to the terms of the tied grants under s 96. The Court 
rejected this argument in both cases. 
 44 First Uniform Tax Case (n 42) 417 (Latham CJ). 
 45 The Commonwealth ‘may properly induce a State to exercise its powers … by offering a 
money grant’: ibid. 
 46 Taylor (n 6) 1461–2 (citations omitted). 
 47 As French CJ observed in Williams [No 1] (n 20): ‘The financial dominance of the 
Commonwealth Government in relation to the States was no doubt anticipated by some 
delegates, although almost certainly not to the degree which has eventuated, particularly in 
the field of taxation [and] the use of conditional grants under s 96’: at 204 [59]. See also 
Gabrielle Appleby, ‘There Must Be Limits: The Commonwealth Spending Power’ (2009) 37 
Federal Law Review 93. 
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more they were susceptible to pressure to accept s 96 tied grant conditions 
that reduced their jurisdictional autonomy. 
The orthodox interpretation of s 96 has been the source of increasing 
caution and criticism as the Court — and indeed legal scholars — has moved 
away (although never too far away) from the strict formalism of the Engineers’ 
Case towards a more holistic and contextual one.48 Many have called for a 
reconsideration, if not reform, of the section.49 As will be seen, those calls and 
the criticisms they are based on remain relevant today. 
A  The (Outstanding) Fundamental Problems with s 96 
In 1988, Saunders argued that s 96 is ‘conceptually flawed, and therefore sits 
uneasily with the constitutional principles on which the Constitution is based 
and with other provisions of the Constitution itself’.50 While accepting that the 
early High Court had apparently sought to resolve these conceptual flaws,  
its formalism created a range of outstanding questions and ‘fundamental 
problems’.51 These include uncertainties about the following aspects of  
the provision. 
1 Termination Clause 
Saunders pointed out that there had been a lack of genuine judicial scrutiny of 
the continued use of the section, despite the apparent intention that it be 
limited to 10 years ‘and thereafter until the Parliament otherwise provides’,52 
to allow for federal fiscal restructuring.53 While this may seem like a trite  
issue — insofar as the High Court is extremely unlikely to compel Parliament 
to exercise its discretion to terminate the provision — accepting that it must 
not do this has consequences. Foremost is the fact that, if the section is never  
to be terminated, it must be considered to be a permanent constitutional 
fixture, with implications for how it is interpreted within the overall 
constitutional framework. 
 
 48 See Chordia (n 15). 
 49 See, eg, McLeish (n 15) 183; Chordia (n 15) 90. 
 50 Saunders, ‘Part 2’ (n 11) 699. 
 51 Saunders, ‘Part 1’ (n 11) 14. 
 52 Constitution s 96. 
 53 Saunders, ‘Part 1’ (n 11) 8–10. 
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2 Parliamentary Involvement 
Saunders accepted the orthodox interpretation of the provision as 
‘presumably’ being ‘legislative in character’ because it is conferred upon 
Parliament.54 She therefore accepted the orthodox view that ‘[l]ike other 
legislative powers it may be delegated to the executive’.55 However, Saunders 
noted that various unexplored implications arose from the way it is conferred. 
Specifically, Parliament is: 
1 first, conferred with the power to grant aid; and 
2 second, conferred with the power to determine the terms and conditions 
of that grant.56 
This will be referred to herein as a ‘double conferral’ of power upon 
Parliament. In respect of this double conferral of power, Saunders argued that 
[c]onferral on the Parliament of power to grant financial assistance to the  
States … is consistent with the constitutional scheme for parliamentary control 
of finance … The power to determine the terms and conditions attached to the 
grant, however, is of greater substance, being, at least potentially, regulatory in 
nature …  
… [And] might have been considered to fall within the scope of executive 
power had it not been conferred on the Parliament under section 96.57 
Saunders noted that the double conferral thus raised significant and 
unexplored ‘implications both for the powers exercisable by the respective 
arms of government at the Commonwealth level and for the absolute scope of 
Commonwealth legislative power’.58 She also noted that it created ‘genuine 
uncertainty about the extent to which the executive is constrained in 
imposing conditions by the limits of authority granted by Parliament or by the 
absence of any authority at all’.59 As will be discussed at length below, 
Saunders’ concern about the role of the executive in exercising unconstrained 
financial powers has subsequently received broader attention by the High 
 
 54 Ibid 11. 
 55 Ibid. 
 56 Ibid 10. 
 57 Ibid. 
 58 Ibid. 
 59 Saunders, ‘Part 2’ (n 11) 700. 
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Court, with important implications for our understanding of the constitutive 
character of s 96.60 
3 The Meaning of ‘State’ 
Saunders further highlighted uncertainty about what the section means when 
it describes the recipient of financial assistance as being ‘any State’.61 That is, 
whether ‘state’ means Parliament, the executive, polity or otherwise. 
Furthermore, Saunders questioned whether the terms and conditions of a 
grant could require the state to act as a mere agent to transfer the aid to a non-
state entity. Saunders noted (quite presciently) that ‘the Court has not yet 
considered an arrangement in which the involvement of a State was 
completely nominal, although such arrangements exist and are likely to 
become more frequent’.62 
4 Restrictions and Limitations 
Finally, Saunders raised questions about the lack of internal limitations within 
the provision,63 and the assumption that meant that the terms and conditions 
of a grant under s 96 was not limited by constitutional guarantees more 
generally.64 Even 30 years ago, when Saunders was writing, a series of 
incidental cases suggested such a view could not be supported.65 Saunders 
argued that 
[f ]undamental as these problems are, they have not yet directly been 
considered by the High Court. While the questions to which they give rise can 
be canvassed, therefore, no final, authoritative answers can be given. The 






 60 As will be discussed, this contemporary jurisprudence questions the assumption that the 
provision is at all legislative and capable of delegation, marking a departure from the 
conclusions Saunders reached at the time: see below Part IV(B). 
 61 Saunders, ‘Part 1’ (n 11) 13–14. 
 62 Ibid 30. 
 63 Ibid 27–9. 
 64 Ibid 12. 
 65 Ibid 12, 23–4. 
 66 Ibid 14. 
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Hence, she warned 
it might be unwise to assume that [all s 96] schemes would automatically 
succeed, particularly in view of the greater preparedness of the more recent 
High Court to consider the substance of challenged laws.67 
B  Thirty Years on, the Situation Lasts 
As will be discussed in the following sections, while the High Court has 
signalled ‘some readiness to depart from the orthodox [s 96] cases’,68 this has 
been limited to obiter or incidental discussions of the section (albeit 
increasingly in majority).69 In fact, the Court has not directly dealt with the 
section for almost 80 years.70 In the Court’s defence, that is not entirely its 
fault. The adversarial process is reactive and is generally reliant on litigants 
who have standing, capacity and dissatisfaction with the current state of play 
to bring matters before the Court. Section 96 is ultimately about grants of 
money and, as the old adage goes, recipients of those monies are unlikely to 
bite the hand that feeds them. Indeed, those organisations have a vested 
interest in sustaining such exercises of power, whether they are within 
constitutional limits or not. 
The result is that, while the Court might have indicated a tacit agreement 
with the scholars who have criticised the orthodox approach, it has not 
overruled or reinterpreted it. In the absence of judicial supervision, the 
Commonwealth has been free to enact ever more liberally constructed 
regimes that increase its sphere of financial, if not legislative, influence. 
While concern about the use of s 96 by the Commonwealth has historically 
been relegated to scholarly and professional journals, that is shifting. Most 
notable perhaps was the recent proposal to grant over AUD1 billion in 
Commonwealth monies to multinational firm Adani Pty Ltd in aid of its 
 
 67 Ibid 26. 
 68 Chordia (n 15) 76. 
 69 The two most notable examples are A-G (Vic) ex rel Black v Commonwealth (1981) 146 CLR 
559 (‘DOGS Case’) and ICM Agriculture (n 16), in which the majority accepted that s 96 
could not be used to establish any religion or acquire property other than on just terms, due 
to the express limitations in s 116 and s 51(xxxi) of the Constitution, respectively. However, 
the Court found that the impugned legislation did not amount to the establishment of a 
religion in the former, or the acquisition of property in the latter. 
 70 It was last dealt with directly in the Flour Tax Case (n 9). 
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construction of Australia’s largest coal mine in Queensland’s Galilee Basin.71 
This was to occur pursuant to a s 96 tied grant made under the Northern 
Australia Infrastructure Facility Act 2016 (Cth) (‘NAIF Act’).72 That proposal 
drew the ire of environmental campaigners — who threatened to challenge it 
in the High Court73 — and served to bring s 96 into the national spotlight.74 
All the questions raised by Saunders 30 years before were brought into the 
public domain, not least because the Northern Australia Infrastructure 
Facility (‘NAIF’) regime is solely reliant upon s 96 for its constitutional 
validity, reinforcing the treatment of the provision as a permanent 
constitutional fixture. More pertinently, the question of parliamentary 
involvement was brought into relief by the debate. Bar passing the NAIF Act, 
the Commonwealth Parliament has no role in determining individual 
grants,75 nor their terms and conditions,76 which is solely the responsibility of 
the NAIF, a statutory corporation.77 The NAIF is legislatively empowered to 
 
 71 See generally John Hewson, ‘The Queensland Election Outcome is a Death Knell for Adani’s 
Coal Mine’, The Conversation (online, 28 November 2017) <https://theconversation.com/the-
queensland-election-outcome-is-a-death-knell-for-adanis-coal-mine-88148>, archived at 
<https://perma.cc/563X-5T9X>. 
 72 The proposal has been the source of sharp national controversy, especially around its 
potential social, environmental and cultural impacts. Campaigners have described it as the 
most significant national environmental issue since the controversy that led to the Tasmanian 
Dam Case (n 4): Bob Brown, ‘The Adani Mine is This Generation’s Franklin River. People 
Power Can Stop It’, The Guardian (online, 24 March 2017) <https://www.theguardian. 
com/commentisfree/2017/mar/24/the-adani-mine-is-this-generations-franklin-river-people-
power-can-stop-it>, archived at <https://perma.cc/A53K-GDCN>. 
 73 See generally Gogarty (n 21). 
 74 See, eg, ‘Adani: Premier Annastacia Palaszczuk Withdraws Government Involvement in  
Mine Funding’, ABC News (online, 4 November 2017) <http://www.abc.net.au/news/ 
2017-11-03/premier-annastacia-palaszczuk-veto-qld-government-adani-brisbane/9117594>, 
archived at <https://perma.cc/KG38-PDEE>. 
 75 The responsible Minister is precluded from directing the Northern Australia Infrastructure 
Facility (‘NAIF’) in the making of the grant or the terms and conditions of that aid and may 
only veto a decision of the NAIF on narrow policy, security or international relations 
considerations. Rather, the Minister may issue broad legislative instruments, entitled 
‘Investment Mandates’, which direct the general conduct of the NAIF and its Board: NAIF 
Act (n 16) ss 9(4), 11(5), 14; Northern Australia Infrastructure Facility Investment Mandate 
Direction 2016 (Cth) (‘Investment Mandate’). 
 76 NAIF Act (n 16) s 7(1)(b). 
 77 The NAIF is established as a body corporate and is overseen by a CEO and a Board of experts 
in economics, finance, national and related infrastructure developments: NAIF Act (n 16)  
ss 6, 14–15, 28. 
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administer AUD5 billion in Commonwealth monies on northern Australian 
infrastructure projects.78 
The NAIF–Adani debate also reinforced Saunders’ prediction that future 
regimes would establish ‘arrangement[s] in which the involvement of a State 
was completely nominal’.79 Much of the controversy appeared to focus on the 
bypassing of state Parliaments through ‘pass through’ agreements made by 
state and Commonwealth executives and the NAIF. Under the agreements, 
state executives are committed to acting as a conduit for the granting of 
Commonwealth monies, by the NAIF to (ordinarily corporate, non-state) 
recipients. These financial arrangements mean Commonwealth money is not 
received by the state into its consolidated revenue fund, nor its expenditure 
approved by its Parliament.80 The state executive is empowered to provide 
‘written notification that financial assistance should not be provided to a 
Project’, but neither it, nor its Parliament, has an active decision-making or 
endorsement role on behalf of the proponent.81 Critics also argued that the 
loan constituted preferential treatment to one company over others facing 
similar conditions,82 raising questions about whether the regime was truly in 
harmony with the free trade guarantees and restrictions found within ch IV of 
the Constitution. 
This paper is not about the NAIF, nor does it seek to directly question the 
validity or constitutionality of the loans proposed to be made under it. 
However, the public debate about those questions serves to highlight that, 
despite warnings that the ‘situation is unlikely to last’ in relation to the 
 
 78 Ibid s 41. 
 79 Saunders, ‘Part 1’ (n 11) 30. 
 80 The agreement, described as a ‘Master Facility Agreement’, is a tripartite one between the 
relevant state, Commonwealth and NAIF. As a result of the agreement, the ‘Commonwealth’s 
borrowings for the NAIF project will remain on the Commonwealth balance sheet and not 
on Queensland’s’: Queensland, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 29 November 
2016, 4630 (Curtis Pitt). This effectively means the money is not treated as state income, 
incorporated into its consolidated revenue or supervised by its Parliament. 
 81 If that jurisdiction provides a ‘written notification that financial assistance should not be 
provided to a Project’, the NAIF ‘must not make an Investment Decision’: Investment 
Mandate (n 75) s 13(4). 
 82 Australian Conservation Foundation, ‘A Fistful of Dollars: Adani’s Preferential Treatment by 
Federal, State and Local Australian Governments’ (Research Brief, October 2017) 8 
<https://www.acf.org.au/reports>, archived at <https://perma.cc/93QN-49EZ>. See also 
Julien Vincent, ‘Bailing out Adani is the Definition of Absurd’, The Sydney Morning Herald 
(online, 4 October 2017) <https://www.smh.com.au/business/companies/adani-could-be-
derailed-if-900m-loan-denied-20171004-gyu4iv.html>. 
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orthodox interpretation of s 96, the status quo has been maintained.83 The 
controversy also indicates an increased public awareness and concern about 
the use of tied grants, especially by public interest campaigners. Whether this 
continues is uncertain but, in the short term, it is likely to make NAIF loans,84 
and indeed other infrastructure grant loans made under s 96, more 
susceptible to scrutiny and challenge.85 If that was to occur, regimes like those 
established under the NAIF Act may find themselves on shaky legal ground. 
That is because, while the regulatory operationalisation of s 96 has changed 
little over the last 30 years, the constitutional landscape has shifted markedly 
around it. The potential impacts of such a change and what it means for s 96 
regimes will be discussed below. 
III   PAPE ,  WILLIAMS  A N D  T H E  RE I N T E G R AT I O N  O F  S  96 
The issues of standing and financial self-interest that have stymied direct 
review of s 96 by the High Court have, historically, had a broader impact on 
the review of ch IV more generally. Indeed, it took well over a century for the 
Commonwealth financial powers truly to be subject to constitutional 
 
 83 Saunders, ‘Part 1’ (n 11) 14; see above nn 14, 66 and accompanying text. Indeed, it is likely to 
continue into the near future. Following public backlash to the Adani loan proposal, the 
embattled Queensland Government promised to ‘veto’ it should the Government be returned 
to power, arguably swinging the November 2017 election in its favour. The subsequent veto of 
the pass-through by the Premier of Queensland in November 2017 appears to have been 
resolved by political, rather than legal, means. Once again, s 96 had eluded direct scrutiny by 
the High Court: see ‘Adani: Premier Annastacia Palaszczuk Withdraws Government 
Involvement in Mine Funding’, ABC News (online, 4 Nov 2017) <http://www.abc.net.au/ 
news/2017-11-03/premier-annastacia-palaszczuk-veto-qld-government-adani-brisbane/9117 
594>, archived at <https://perma.cc/KG38-PDEE>. 
 84 Following revelations that Adani had applied for a NAIF loan, it was later reported that 
Queensland state-owned companies also applied for NAIF funding to build infrastructure 
that would assist in Adani’s proposed mining operations: Matthew Stevens, ‘Aurizon  
Returns to the Galilee Basin with Northern Infrastructure Fund Plan’, Australian Financial 
Review (online, 15 March 2017) <http://www.afr.com/business/energy/aurizon-returns- 
to-the-galilee-basin-with-northern-infrastructure-fund-plan-20170315-guys3y>, archived at 
<https://perma.cc/BJF6-ZZLZ>. 
 85 Hence, the declaration of the first tied grant of Commonwealth monies under the NAIF Act 
(n 16) to a Western Australian mining company has already stirred opposition amongst 
environmental campaigners there, notwithstanding that the appropriate legal mechanisms 
apparently required by the Act to transfer the money have not been put in place: see  
Michael Slezak, ‘Western Australia Port to Get $16.8m Government Loan to Support Oil and 
Gas’, The Guardian (online, 10 October 2017) <https://www.theguardian.com/australia-
news/2017/oct/10/western-australia-port-set-to-get-get-16m-loan>, archived at <https:// 
perma.cc/7UNR-3K79>. 
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challenge. Even then, it only occurred due to a combination of unique 
circumstances — in the form of the global financial crisis — and an even 
more unique litigant in the form of Bryan Pape, who was willing to contest the 
payment of money the Commonwealth had given him (and over a third of 
Australians) to obviate the economic impacts of the crisis.86 
In Pape v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (‘Pape’), the majority found 
the source of authority for Commonwealth spending to be in the implied 
nationhood power, seated in the intersection of s 61 and s 51(xxxix).87 Despite 
his ostensible loss, Mr Pape struck a larger blow against unfettered 
Commonwealth spending powers when the High Court concluded that, in the 
absence of that legislative power, the appropriation power in s 81 would not, 
of itself, authorise the Commonwealth’s stimulus package.88 Mr Pape had 
opened a fault line beneath the previously unassailable bedrock of Canberra, 
which would rupture in Williams v Commonwealth (‘Williams [No 1]’) and 
create aftershocks that may finally unsettle the orthodoxy of s 96.89 
The relevance of the Pape decision to s 96 was hinted at a year later in ICM 
Agriculture Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (‘ICM Agriculture’).90 The special case 
involved a challenge to an intergovernmental agreement partly supported by  
s 96, which regulated agricultural water supply. The plaintiffs argued this 
amounted to an acquisition of property other than on just terms, as required 
by s 51(xxxi) of the Constitution. The majority (6:1) determined that the 
regulation of such licenses did not constitute an acquisition of property, and 
thus the s 96 question did not fall for consideration.91 Indeed, half the 
majority chose not to address it at all.92 However, those who did (French CJ, 
Gummow and Crennan JJ) accepted that the terms and conditions of a s 96 
grant must conform to the limits of s 51(xxxi).93 That is, such terms and 
 
 86 Pape v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (2009) 238 CLR 1 (‘Pape’). As George Williams has 
rightly summarised: ‘It takes a brave person to stand between the Commonwealth and an 
offer of cash to nearly 9 million taxpayers, let alone in the midst of a global economic 
recession’: George Williams, ‘Brian Pape and His Legacy to the Law’ (2015) 34(1) University 
of Queensland Law Journal 29, 38. 
 87 Pape (n 86) 64 [136] (French CJ), 83 [212]–[213] (Gummow, Crennan and Bell JJ). 
 88 Ibid 36 [53], 45 [81], 55 [111], 55–6 [113] (French CJ), 82–3 [210] (Gummow, Crennan and 
Bell JJ), 103 [290], 113 [320] (Hayne and Kiefel JJ). 
 89 Williams [No 1] (n 20). 
 90 See ICM Agriculture (n 16) 169 [41] (French CJ, Gummow and Crennan JJ). 
 91 Ibid 181 [89] (French CJ, Gummow and Crennan JJ), 203 [155] (Hayne, Kiefel and Bell JJ). 
 92 Ibid 199 [141] (Hayne, Kiefel and Bell JJ). 
 93 Ibid 166 [32]. In doing so, their Honours upheld the earlier authority of P J Magennis Pty  
Ltd v Commonwealth, which ‘rejected the proposition that a federal statute giving financial 
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conditions cannot be used to allow the Commonwealth to acquire property 
other than on just terms. That view was formed in light of ‘developments in 
interpretation of the Constitution’, specifically an approach which looks 
‘beyond matters of legal form and to the practical effect of the law  
in question’.94 
Three years after Pape was decided, an equally principled Mr Williams 
sought to challenge unconstrained Commonwealth expenditure. In Williams 
[No 1], the spending related to Commonwealth funding of a not-for-profit 
religious corporation to deliver chaplaincy services in Queensland state 
schools.95 In an inversion of the Pape decision, Mr Williams lost his primary 
argument — that the payments were prohibited by s 116 of the Constitution — 
but ultimately succeeded in challenging the Commonwealth’s spending 
power. Specifically, the High Court found that the financial power to 
appropriate monies under s 81 is not, of itself, a power to spend monies for 
any purpose. In the constitutional state, possessing money does not authorise 
the spending of that money. Rather, that expenditure must be consistent with 
the constitutional limits of representative government and federalism.96 As 
will be seen, this has significant implications for our understanding of the 
financial decision-making powers conferred by s 96. 
Whether s 96 could have been relied upon to legitimately fund school 
chaplains was not addressed in Williams [No 1].97 However, the fact that it had 
not been used was considered relevant to the legitimacy of those payments.98 
Hence, Gummow and Bell JJ considered that 
while the engagement of the legislative branch of government marked off Pape 
from cases where there is, by reason of the absence of such engagement, a 
deficit in the system of representative government, there remains in common 
 
assistance to States was for that reason not a law with respect to the acquisition of property’: 
(1949) 80 CLR 382, 403 (Latham CJ). 
 94 Ibid 169 [40], [44] (French CJ, Gummow and Crennan JJ). 
 95 Williams [No 1] (n 20). 
 96 See ibid 217–18 [88]–[90] (Gummow and Bell JJ), 248 [191]–[192] (Hayne J), 351–2 [516] 
(Crennan J). 
 97 See Williams [No 1] (n 20) 179–80 [4] (French CJ), 217 [88] (Gummow and Bell JJ),  
240–1 [172] (Hayne J), 336 [451] (Crennan J), 361 [556]–[557] (Kiefel J). 
 98 See ibid 179–80 [4], 204–5 [59] (French CJ), 217–18 [88]–[91], 234–6 [143]–[148] 
(Gummow and Bell JJ), 246 [189], 259 [219], 267–71 [243]–[253] (Hayne J), 347 [501],  
351 [514]–[515], 354 [532] (Crennan J), 361 [556], 363 [563], 373 [592]–[593] (Kiefel J). 
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with any assessment of the [impugned legislation] the considerations of 
federalism, stimulated by the by-passing by the Executive of s 96.99 
Similarly, Hayne J stated that the 
Commonwealth expenditure that is under consideration would not only give  
s 96 of the Constitution a place in the constitutional framework very different 
from the place it has hitherto been understood to occupy but also render it 
otiose.100 
These views would be endorsed by the entire majority when Mr Williams 
returned to the High Court some two years later, this time to challenge the 
Commonwealth’s attempt to legislatively validate the chaplaincy program 
(and others made by executive contract) under s 51(xxiiiA) and s 51(xx) of 
the Constitution in Williams v Commonwealth (‘Williams [No 2]’).101 
In Williams [No 2], the High Court concluded that merely granting money 
to a subject is not the same as making a law about a subject.102 Consequently, 
neither of the purported powers the Commonwealth had relied upon  
to justify its grants had been truly enlivened. As will be discussed, this  
is especially relevant to the constitutive characterisation of s 96 of the 
Constitution. Equally important was that the High Court rejected the 
Commonwealth’s argument that the legislation was supported by the implied 
nationhood power, because ‘the States had been consulted about and had 
supported the extension of the chaplaincy program’.103 Rather, the Court held 
that the cooperative mechanisms within the Constitution, such as s 96, must 
be properly engaged with.104 Hence, the plurality (with whom Crennan J 
agreed in a separate judgment) asserted that if the Commonwealth and states 
were to join together in ‘achieving common ends’, they may only do so by, and 
within, the limits of a specific constitutional provision providing for such 
cooperative governance, namely s 96.105 
 
 99 Ibid 234 [143]. 
 100 Ibid 267 [243]. 
 101 (2014) 252 CLR 416 (‘Williams [No 2]’). 
 102 Ibid 460 [47]–[48] (French CJ, Hayne, Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ). 
 103 Ibid 467 [73] (French CJ, Hayne, Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ). 
 104 See ibid 467 [74] (French CJ, Hayne, Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ, Crennan J agreeing  
at 471 [99]). 
 105 Ibid. The Court noted: ‘The Constitution contains several provisions by which the States and 
the Commonwealth may join in achieving common ends. It is enough to mention … s 96 
(about grants on condition)’: at 467 [74] (French CJ, Hayne, Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ) 
(emphasis added). 
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The entire Court consequently confirmed and reinforced what had been 
variously asserted in Williams [No 1], specifically that s 96 has a formal and 
legal role within the Constitution as a conduit through which cooperative 
federal fiscalism is to be achieved.106 The exact dimensions of this conduit are 
to be defined with reference to that federal system rather than ignoring it. 
Thus, the majority in Williams [No 2] stated: 
The history of British constitutional practice is important … But it says nothing 
at all about any of the other provisions of Ch IV of the Constitution … 
[including s] 96 (about payments to States). And questions about the ambit of 
the Executive’s power to spend [in relation to those financial provisions] must 
be decided in light of all of the relevant provisions of the Constitution.107 
While the Court did not go on to explain what this meant for s 96  
specifically — nor explain which provisions were relevant and which were  
not — the plurality in Williams [No 2] appears to have put to rest any 
assumptions that s 96 is an island of Commonwealth spending power, much 
less one defined by reference to any one organ of government. While the 
Constitution may have created a new form of fiscal power in s 96, it is not 
axiomatic that a new power is independent or unbounded. 
Like all fiscal powers, s 96 is constrained and limited. In the case of s 96, 
these constraints and limitations are determined not by historic convention, 
but contextually with reference to the system of federal fiscalism established by 
ch IV. As Gummow and Bell JJ warned in Williams [No 1], defining financial 
powers otherwise 
not only alters what may be called the financial federalism of the Constitution 
but it permits the Commonwealth effectively to interfere, without the consent 
of the State, in matters covered by the residue of governmental power assigned 
by the Constitution to the State.108 
IV  T H E  I M P L IC AT I O N S  O F  A  R E I N T E G R AT E D  S  96 
The process of reintegrating s 96 into the constitutional framework has largely 
been incidental to the High Court’s more specific focus on other 
 
 106 See above nn 99, 100. 
 107 Williams [No 2] (n 101) 468–9 [80] (French CJ, Hayne, Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ) (emphasis 
added). 
 108 Williams [No 1] (n 20) 236 [148], quoting Victoria v Commonwealth (1975) 134 CLR 338, 358 
(Barwick CJ) (‘AAP Case’). 
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constitutional provisions, such as s 61 and s 81 of the Constitution. The Court 
has not given similarly direct attention to the words of s 96 itself, but its 
attention to the surrounding provisions have greatly informed our 
understanding of it. The result is that, while a number of questions 
highlighted by Saunders remain unanswered, we are better able to predict 
what the answers to them would be if the Court completes its exegesis of  
ch IV by considering s 96 directly. 
A  Termination Clause 
It is a somewhat trite observation that the Commonwealth Parliament is 
unlikely to voluntarily terminate s 96. Notwithstanding the section was 
apparently intended to be transitional,109 the early High Court interpreted it 
in such a way that ensured the very body empowered to provide for its 
termination has a vested interest in allowing it to continue to operate  
in perpetuity. 
So too has the recent Court endorsed the treatment of the provision as 
continuing in perpetuity, albeit for different reasons. That is, the provision is 
now viewed as one of the proper constitutional conduits for transfers to the 
states,110 suggesting both essentiality and permanence. It therefore now seems 
settled that the section has no (judicially enforceable) temporal limits. 
B  Parliamentary Involvement 
While questions about the temporal limits to the section might have been 
settled, the opposite is true of its double conferral of power upon  
Parliament — notably, the section’s constitutionally unique reference to 
Parliament both granting monies and determining the terms and conditions 
for which they are to be granted. This is especially the case now that s 96 must 
be read ‘in light of all of the relevant provisions of the Constitution’.111 That is, 
the provisions which it interfaces with, its placement in the Constitution and 
 
 
 109 See above Part II. 
 110 See, eg, Williams [No 1] (n 20) 235 [147] (Gummow and Bell JJ), 347 [501] (Crennan J),  
373 [592] (Kiefel J); ICM Agriculture (n 16) 170 [46] (French CJ, Gummow and Crennan JJ), 
199 [140]–[141] (Hayne, Kiefel and Bell JJ). 
 111 Williams [No 2] (n 101) 469 [80] (French CJ, Hayne, Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ) (emphasis 
added). 
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the constitutive nature of its power. The result of this contextual reading of  
s 96 suggests that 
1 s 96 is a not a legislative power; 
2 financial powers are exclusive to Parliament; 
3 federal fiscal supervision is a condition precedent to legislating; and, 
consequently, 
4 the orthodox allowance of executive delegation of terms and conditions is 
now incorrect. 
This line of reasoning and its ultimate conclusion will be discussed in  
detail below. 
1 Section 96 is Not a Legislative Power 
Read contextually, s 96 is a financial, not legislative, power. Indeed, this was 
recognised by those in the orthodox Court who took the time to consider the 
constitutive nature of the provision. In particular, Dixon CJ accepted in the 
Second Uniform Tax Case that 
s 96 does not deal with a legislative subject matter; it does not make some 
interim provision with respect thereto. It confers a bare power of appropriating 
money to a purpose and of imposing conditions. … 
… [I]t must be borne in mind that the power conferred by s 96 is confined 
to granting money and moreover to granting money to governments. It is not a 
power to make laws with respect to a general subject matter.112 
In fact, the practical effect of the majority judgment in both that case and its 
predecessor — that the Commonwealth can induce but not coerce state 
compliance to a grant’s terms and conditions — necessarily leads to that 
conclusion. If the provision was, in fact, legislative, state consent to its terms 
and conditions would not be necessary, because the state would be bound by 
the unilateral exercise of Commonwealth legislative power under the 
provisions of s 109. However, the remainder of the majority of the orthodox 
Court did not dedicate so many energies to the constitutive nature of s 96. 
Instead, it tended to treat the section as a standalone head of legislative power, 
simply because it was invested in the legislature.113 As noted, Saunders 
 
 112 Second Uniform Tax Case (n 38) 604, 609. 
 113 Indeed, Saunders writing in 1987 still presumed that was the case: Saunders, ‘Part 1’  
(n 11) 11. 
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accepted this aspect of the orthodoxy in the first of her papers.114 It is on this 
point that this paper deviates. 
In Pape, the Court emphasised that a power to spend is not a power to 
legislate, simply because it is conferred upon the legislature.115 As potentially 
shocking as that may have seemed at the time, it was simply a reminder that 
not all powers vested in, or exercised by, Parliament are legislative in nature. 
Indeed, in the earlier case of Egan v Willis, McHugh J emphasised that 
Parliament has constitutive ‘legislative, financial [and] critical’ functions.116 
While such functions inevitably overlap in their exercise, they are legally 
distinct, and give rise to different forms of derivative power. We must 
therefore first ask what the nature of the power is before determining what the 
body it is invested in can do with it (including whether it can delegate the 
power to other bodies). 
If s 96 is to be read contextually as an integral part of ch IV, two of its 
features are relevant to its constitutive characterisation. The first and most 
obvious is that it is found in the financial, not legislative chapter of the 
Constitution. The second is that, unlike the actual legislative powers in s 51 
and s 52, s 96 confers no express power upon Parliament to ‘make laws … 
with respect to’ grants. Rather, it merely states that Parliament ‘may grant’, 
indicating an authorisation, but not lawmaking, function. Critically, the 
section then goes on to mention Parliament a second time — a 
constitutionally unique double conferral of power upon that body117 — in 
respect of its responsibility to determine the terms and conditions of the 
grant. This is a complete vesting of financial power in Parliament, not only to 




 114 Ibid. 
 115 Pape (n 86) 23 [8] (French CJ), 75 [185] (Gummow, Crennan and Bell JJ), 102 [289] (Hayne 
and Kiefel JJ), 213 [607] (Heydon J). 
 116 Egan v Willis (n 18) 475 [100], quoting Sir Courtenay Ilbert, ‘Preface’, in Josef Redlich, The 
Procedure of the House of Commons: A Study of its History and Present Form, tr A Ernest 
Steinthal (Archibald Constable & Co, 1908) vol 1, vi. 
 117 When read as a whole, there is quite a clear distinction in ch IV between the 
‘Commonwealth’ in the sense of a polity, and ‘Parliament’ or ‘Parliament of the 
Commonwealth’ as a specific organ of that polity. Indeed, even beyond that chapter, s 1 of the 
Constitution states that ‘[t]he legislative power of the Commonwealth shall be vested a 
Federal Parliament … hereinafter called The Parliament, or The Parliament of the 
Commonwealth’ (emphasis added). Indeed, s 96 may be contrasted with other finance and 
trade provisions, including s 81, s 82, s 99 and s 100, which refer to the Commonwealth  
as a polity. 
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in respect of that subject are to be used — suggesting a financial power 
containing regulatory and supervisory aspects, not a legislative power of  
law making.118 
Modern judgments considering the constitutive character of s 96 support 
Dixon CJ’s original conclusion that s 96 ‘does not deal with a legislative 
subject matter’ but is instead a ‘bare’ financial power.119 Hence, in A-G (Vic) ex 
rel Black v Commonwealth (‘DOGS Case’), Mason J accepted that the character 
of s 96 as ‘financial, not regulative’.120 Similarly, French CJ, Gummow and 
Crennan JJ concluded in ICM Agriculture that ‘the legislative power of the 
Commonwealth [is] conferred by ss 96 and 51(xxxvi)’ operating together;121 
indicating the latter was the source of legislative power. Finally, in Pape, 
Hayne and Kiefel JJ summarised: 
It is necessary to construe each provision of the Constitution as part of the 
whole. There is no little danger in taking one of its provisions (eg, s 81), 
construing it in isolation, and then taking that construction as a premise for 
further conclusions about the ambit of other powers …  
… [I]n the case of a number of other provisions of Ch IV of the 
Constitution (eg, ss 87, 93 and 96) the relevant head of legislative power is not 
to be found in Ch IV but rather in s 51(xxxvi).122 
This suggests that, of the three parliamentary functions identified in  
Egan v Willis by McHugh J,123 s 96 is fundamentally a financial one. While  
it may intersect or enliven a power to legislate, such a legislative power  
must be found elsewhere in the Constitution (namely within the actual 
legislative chapter). 
 
 118 On the other hand, Constitution ss 51–2 are silent on Parliament’s role in regulating the topic 
(ie the terms and conditions), leaving the legislature the option of prescribing the terms and 
conditions through legislation, or to delegate this power in the executive branch: see 
Victorian Stevedoring and General Contracting Co Pty Ltd v Dignan (1931) 46 CLR 73, 101 
(Dixon J) (‘Dignan’). 
 119 Second Uniform Tax Case (n 38) 604. 
 120 DOGS Case (n 69) 618, quoting Commonwealth v Colonial Ammunition Co Ltd (1924) 34 
CLR 198, 224 (Isaacs and Rich JJ). See also Williams [No 2] (n 101) where the plurality 
described Constitution ss 93–6 as provisions for ‘payments to states’: at 468 [80] (French CJ, 
Hayne, Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ). 
 121 ICM Agriculture (n 16) 170 [46]. 
 122 Pape (n 86) 102 [288]–[289] (emphasis added). 
 123 See above n 116 and accompanying text. 
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2 Financial Powers are Exclusive to Parliament 
Different categories of parliamentary power give rise to different implications 
for their interface with the executive. That is not least because, unlike 
legislative power, financial and critical powers are supervisory.124 Indeed, as 
Hayne J explained in Williams [No 1]: 
Ch IV (particularly ss … 96 and 97) … provide[s] for parliamentary control 
over the raising and expenditure of public moneys … [including] supervision 
of what is actually received and outlaid (‘the receipt of revenue and the 
expenditure of money on account of the Commonwealth’ (s 97)).125 
As a financial and supervisory power, s 96 cannot be delegated to those it 
controls and supervises. Rather, it must remain, along with the rest of ch IV, 
part of the ‘comprehensive and continuous guardianship’ of the Houses of 
Parliament.126 This is especially the case as it will have a financial and 
regulative impact on the states, whose interests are represented in the Senate. 
3 Federal Fiscal Supervision is a Condition Precedent to Legislating 
Like Pape, Williams [No 1] and Williams [No 2] indicated that we must avoid 
conflating constitutional powers. Williams [No 2] highlighted that, when read 
together, the Constitution may envision a conditional order in which powers 
are to be exercised. Relatedly, it emphasised that, in the constitutional state, 
possessing money does not, of itself, authorise the spending of that money. 
The executive possesses no power of disbursement, and no power to spend 
absent parliamentary authority.127 Hence, the power to spend is only 
enlivened after legislation has been validly passed with respect to a head of 
power, not before. The same is true of s 96, albeit in the opposite direction; 
namely it acts as a condition precedent to legislating. 
Practically, s 96 serves to direct the flow of public monies between two 




 124 Egan v Willis (n 18) 451 [42] (Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ), cited in Williams [No 1]  
(n 20) 349–50 [509] (Crennan J). 
 125 Williams [No 1] (n 20) 259 [219]. 
 126 Combet v Commonwealth (2005) 224 CLR 494, 577 [160] (Gummow, Hayne, Callinan and 
Heydon JJ) (‘Combet’). But see Appleby (n 47) 102. 
 127 AAP Case (n 108) 353 (Barwick CJ). 
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rule of law to the same popular sovereign. Indeed, as O’Connor J stated of the 
surplus revenue provisions of ch IV (specifically s 94): 
In ascertaining the real meaning of the obligation imposed on the 
Commonwealth to distribute [monies] amongst the States … regard must be 
had to the nature, incidents and usual methods of dealing with public revenue 
and public expenditure under a system of parliamentary government, the 
annual accounting to Parliament … the necessity of obtaining in advance 
parliamentary sanction for expenditure … Such are the conditions under which 
the obligations of the Commonwealth to the States must under our 
Parliamentary system necessarily be performed.128 
Like s 94, s 96 involves disbursement of federal monies by the Commonwealth 
Parliament and resultant distribution of monies to the states. Like s 94, its 
placement in the financial chapter of the Constitution denotes the 
fundamental role of the Senate in parliamentary supervision of federal 
finances. That is particularly the case where those monies serve to ‘regulate 
activity in the community in the course of implementing government 
policy’,129 and influencing ‘matters covered by the residue of governmental 
power assigned by the Constitution to the State’.130 
Saunders was thus quite right to point out that the express conferral of the 
power to determine terms and conditions of a grant ‘might [ordinarily] have 
been considered to fall within the scope of executive power had it not been 
conferred on the Parliament under section 96’.131 What is now clearer is  
why such an express conferral is necessary, and why it should not be treated as  
a mere accident of last-minute drafting. The executive is so deprived because 
both the power to determine a grant and to set its terms and conditions  
are aspects of a financial power, which must be exercised by Parliament  
as conditions precedent to the enlivenment of legislative authority under  
s 51(xxxvi).132 That is especially the case because it is the terms and 
 
 128 New South Wales v Commonwealth (1908) 7 CLR 179, 198 (emphasis added). 
 129 Williams [No 1] (n 20) 352 [521] (Crennan J). 
 130 Ibid 236 [148] (Gummow and Bell JJ), quoting AAP Case (n 108) 357–8 (Barwick CJ). 
 131 Saunders, ‘Part 1’ (n 11) 10. 
 132 Namely, Parliament must have considered and agreed: (a) what the financial assistance will 
be; (b) to which state or states it will be granted; and (c) the terms and conditions it will 
impose upon the grant. Only once this is done does a constitutional fact arise to authorise the 
legislative power under s 51(xxxvi). The question of whether the incident itself could be 
delegated in a general sense is uncertain. One would suspect not, given each incidental power 
is reliant upon the existence of a primary power to operate. It is more likely that once the 
primary source of power or authority has been enlivened, and a constitutional fact upon 
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conditions, as much as the making of the grant, which interfere with the 
federal fiscal balance, by binding and benefiting some states over others in  
the federation. As Mason J noted in Victoria v Commonwealth, neither 
convenience nor implication justify creating a standalone head of national 
spending power for the Commonwealth executive.133 Indeed, as his Honour 
pointed out, s 96 supports the notion that the opposite is true, that ‘there is a 
very large area of activity which lies outside the executive power of the 
Commonwealth’ and solely within the province of the states.134 This is a 
limitation that can only be altered through the proper exercise of 
parliamentary authority under s 96. 
Underlying both Williams [No 1] and Williams [No 2] was a concern that 
not using s 96 to financially influence matters outside of the core heads of 
legislative power would ‘undermine parliamentary control of the executive 
branch and weaken the role of the Senate’ as the states’ House.135 Yet, that 
logically means that s 96 itself cannot be used to undermine the constitutional 
function of Parliament or the Senate because, according to the Court, the 
section exists to guarantee that payments to the states will be approved by  
the Senate.136 
While it is true that the Senate may not always fulfil its intended role as the 
states’ House, it does not alter the fact that, when the Constitution was being 
drafted, that is how it was meant to operate. As French CJ noted in  
Williams [No 1]: 
The function of the Senate as a chamber designed to protect the interests of the 
States may now be vestigial … [but] it has not resulted in any constitutional 
inflation of the scope of executive power, which must still be understood by 
reference to the ‘truly federal government’ of which Inglis Clark wrote in 1901 
and which, along with responsible government, is central to the Constitution.137 
Thus, s 96 cannot, of itself, authorise unfettered executive spending. In fact, 
for Williams [No 1] and Williams [No 2] to have practical and genuine 
constitutional meaning, the opposite must be true. By requiring 
 
which the incident is reliant comes into existence, then Parliament must still legislate to 
establish the regulatory framework within which the executive may be delegated power to 
apply that law: Dignan (n 118) 119–23 (Evatt J). 
 133 AAP Case (n 108) 398. 
 134 Ibid. 
 135 Williams [No 1] (n 20) 205 [60] (French CJ). 
 136 Ibid. 
 137 Ibid 205–6 [61]. 
2018]    (Re)Interpreting Section 96 in Light of Fiscal Federalism 483 
parliamentary scrutiny of both a grant and its conditions, any discriminatory 
aspects of the proposed grant may be responded to by affected states 
(nominally at least) through the Senate. The result is to bring into serious 
doubt the other dangerous assumption about s 96: the ability of it to be 
delegated to the executive. 
4 The Orthodox Allowance of Executive Delegation of Terms and Conditions is 
Now Incorrect 
All of what is set out above in relation to fiscal-federalism leads to a 
conclusion that s 96 is a power and duty solely invested in Parliament. This 
appears to contradict orthodox assumptions about the capacity of Parliament 
to delegate the powers in s 96 to the executive. The source, strength and 
continued relevance of that orthodox authority is now in question and needs 
to be revisited. 
The assumption that Parliament can delegate its s 96 powers arises out of 
Latham CJ’s judgment in the Flour Tax Case — and has been relied on ever 
since138 — where his Honour concluded: 
Parliament does fix the terms and conditions of the grant if, by legislation, it 
authorizes a Minister to determine such terms and conditions. It is too late now 
to argue that terms and conditions determined by a Minister under such 
[delegated] legislation are not determined by the Parliament.139 
Latham CJ justified this conclusion on two grounds: 
• the apparent decision of the High Court to reject arguments that s 96 
could not be delegated to the executive in the Federal Roads Case;140 and 
• a stream of authority — culminating in Victoria Stevedoring and General 
Contracting Co Pty Ltd v Dignan (‘Dignan’) — supporting executive 
delegation as a necessary incident of legislative power.141 
The first of Latham CJ’s grounds for concluding the delegable nature of s 96 is 
most easily dismissed. As already noted, the Federal Roads Case was expressed 
 
 138 For example, in the First Uniform Tax Case, Latham CJ and Williams J both cited  
Latham CJ’s dicta in the Flour Tax Case to discount the plaintiff’s objection to delegation of 
some powers to the Treasurer of the Commonwealth: First Uniform Tax Case (n 42) 415–16 
(Latham CJ), 464 (Williams J), citing Flour Tax Case (n 9) 763 (Latham CJ). The delegation of  
s 96 powers was not raised or addressed by the Court at all in the Second Uniform Tax Case 
(n 38). 
 139 Flour Tax Case (n 9) 763. 
 140 Ibid, discussing Federal Roads Case (n 8) 405. 
 141 Flour Tax Case (n 9) 763. 
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in a three-sentence judgment that lacked any reasoning or ratio. Indeed, no 
reference was made to delegation of s 96 in that case at all. Instead, Latham CJ 
drew his conclusions from what he understood the parties to the matter had 
argued before the Court — and therefore what the Court had tacitly rejected. 
Implying a stream of authority from extra-judicial sources, rather than from 
the recorded judgment itself, is highly questionable, especially as it occurred 
during the height of Engineers’ Case formalism. To the extent that the Flour 
Tax Case relies on the Federal Roads Case, it should not be seen as amounting 
to any more reliable authority than its predecessor. 
While Latham CJ’s second ground is ostensibly justified by a stream of 
authority, the modern view of the constitutive character of s 96 denies the 
legitimacy of that authority;142 as does contemporary jurisprudence that 
highlights the mistake of assuming a power is legislative simply because it is 
conferred upon Parliament.143 Every one of the authorities relied upon by 
Latham CJ in the Flour Tax Case, including the most prominent, Dignan,144 
were addressed to legislative powers under s 51 and s 52. This is a different 
category of power than the financial power in s 96, whose exercise may 
establish the conditions precedent to legislating, but is not itself a power  
to legislate. 
It is only once the conditions of s 96 have been met that a constitutional 
fact arises sufficient to enliven s 51(xxxvi) (‘matters in respect of which this 
Constitution makes provision until the Parliament otherwise provides’), or the 
incidental power of s 51(xxxix). Even then, Parliament must pass laws with 
respect to the constitutional fact so enlivened — specifically, a defined exercise 
of authority to make a grant of aid, on specified terms and conditions — that 
the legislative power may be delegated. To do otherwise would invert the 
constitutional order established by the interrelationship between s 96 and  
s 51(xxxvi). It would also provide the executive with the power to determine 
the subject matter of a law under s 51(xxxvi),145 and invest it with the power 
 
 142 Second Uniform Tax Case (n 38) 604 (Dixon J); DOGS Case (n 69) 618 (Mason J);  
ICM Agriculture (n 16) 170 [46] (French CJ, Gummow and Crennan JJ); Pape (n 86)  
102 [288]–[289] (Hayne and Kiefel JJ). 
 143 Williams [No 2] (n 101) 457 [36] (French CJ, Hayne, Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ). 
 144 See Dignan (n 118) 119–23 (Evatt J). 
 145 Ibid. Evatt J noted: ‘[A] law with respect to the legislative power to deal with the subject … 
would not be truly described as being a law with respect to [a constitutional head of power]’: 
at 120. See also Giris Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1969) 119 CLR 365, 373 
(Barwick CJ). 
2018]    (Re)Interpreting Section 96 in Light of Fiscal Federalism 485 
to actually make law.146 As the plurality noted in Western Australia v 
Commonwealth: 
The content of any such law is one which the Parliament must itself consider 
although a delegation to the Executive Government to make a law of a 
regulatory kind to implement an Act of the Parliament can find support in that 
paragraph.147 
As discussed, s 96 establishes conditions precedent to legislating by incident 
of s 51(xxxvi); specifically, that Parliament consider and approve each grant of 
aid and its terms and conditions. Only once such consideration has properly 
occurred, the purpose and content of legislation determined, and monies 
appropriated to that purpose — however broadly described in the sense of 
Combet v Commonwealth148 or Wilkie v Commonwealth149 — can the 
executive be delegated powers to regulate it. The difference between s 81 (to 
which those decisions relate) and s 96 is, as confirmed in Pape, that the former 
relies on the existence of a valid head of power to establish the subject and 
purpose to which the monies are directed, while the latter creates the subject 
and purpose (by describing the recipient, and the terms and conditions) to 
which money can later be appropriated to.150 Similarly, only once the 
conditions precedent to legislating have been met is Parliament’s power to 
 
 146 In Baxter v Ah Way, Griffith CJ, quoting the Privy Council, considered a purported 
delegation of legislative authority as 
incomplete, as that which does not itself immediately determine the whole area to which 
it is to be applied, but leaves this to be done by the same external authority. If it is an act 
of legislation on the part of the external authority so trusted to enlarge the area within 
which a law actually in operation is to be applied, it would seem a fortiori to be an act of 
legislation to bring the law originally into operation by fixing the time for its 
commencement. 
  Baxter v Ah Way (1909) 8 CLR 626, 633, quoting R v Burah (1878) 3 App Cas 889, 904  
(Lord Selborne). See also Dignan (n 118) 120–1 (Evatt J). 
 147 Western Australia v Commonwealth (1995) 183 CLR 373, 486 (Mason CJ, Brennan, Deane, 
Toohey, Gaudron and McHugh JJ). 
 148 Combet (n 126). 
 149 (2017) 91 AJLR 1035. 
 150 As Isaacs J concluded in New South Wales v Commonwealth (n 128) 200: 
‘Appropriation of money to a Commonwealth purpose’ means legally segregating it from 
the general mass of the Consolidated Fund and dedicating it to the execution of some 
purpose which either the Constitution has itself declared, or Parliament has lawfully 
determined, shall be carried out. So long as that purpose remains unfulfilled but still 
existent and awaiting performance, it appears to me a hopeless contention that money … 
stands ‘appropriated’ for that purpose. 
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create legislative instruments with respect to the resultant legislative power 
enlivened. This does not mean that the executive cannot be vested with 
powers under legislative instrument to administer a regime, once it has been 
determined in its entirety by Parliament. For instance, the executive may be 
lawfully empowered to regulate annual sums according to a prescribed 
legislative formula agreed to by states and the Commonwealth, such as 
occurred in the Flour Tax Case regime.151 Nevertheless, such a delegation by 
legislative instrument would appear to be restricted to truly regulating that 
grant, rather than amounting to a power to establish or require new terms and 
conditions upon that grant. 
In sum, this indicates that Parliament must be directly involved in 
determining the scope and nature of each agreement to grant aid to a state. 
Interestingly, despite the orthodox assumption that Parliament could delegate 
the powers described in s 96, the legislation considered by the courts in those 
cases involved a much more minimal form of delegation than found today. 
Namely they were premised on a negotiated intergovernmental agreement 
followed by complementary state and Commonwealth legislation to support 
it.152 Over time, the practice has shifted to more arms-length regimes which 
 
 151 Wheat Industry Assistance Act 1938 (Cth) s 14, discussed in Flour Tax Case (n 9). 
 152 For example, in the Federal Roads Case (n 8), the impugned legislation specifically referred to 
its cooperative purposes, being ‘[a]n Act to authorize the execution by the Commonwealth of 
agreements between the Commonwealth and the States in relation to the Construction and 
Reconstruction of Federal Aid Roads, and to make provision for the carrying out thereof’:  
at 400. Under the cooperative agreement, incorporated into legislation at both the state and 
Commonwealth level, the states and Commonwealth agreed that the agreement would have 
‘no force or effect and shall not be binding on either party unless and until it is approved 
adopted authorized or ratified by the Parliaments of the Commonwealth and of the state’: 
Federal Aid Roads Act 1926 (Cth) sch 1 cl 1 (emphasis added). See also Federal Aid Roads Act 
1927 (NSW) sch 1 cl 1 (the Parliament of NSW had originally refused to endorse the 
agreement, but eventually capitulated); Federal Aid Roads Agreement Approval Act 1926 (Qld) 
sch 1 cl 1; Federal Aid Roads Agreement Act 1926 (SA) sch 1 cl 1; Commonwealth and State 
Roads Agreement Act 1926 (Tas) sch 1 cl 1; Federal Aid Roads Act 1926 (Vic) sch 1 s 1; Federal 
Aid Roads Agreement Act 1926 (WA) sch 1 s 1. States then passed further legislation 
authorising works under the grant: see, eg, Public Works (Federal Aid Roads) Execution Act 
1927 (Tas); Federal Aid Roads Agreement Approval Act 1926 (Qld); Federal Aid Roads and 
Works Act 1937 (NSW). In respect of the Flour Tax Case (n 9), the regime was accepted by all 
parties as a cooperative involving complementary Commonwealth and state legislation 
‘passed to give effect to a scheme which had been agreed between the Prime Minister of the 
Commonwealth and the Premiers of the six States after a conference at Canberra … [which] 
was carried out by six Commonwealth Acts and by certain State Acts passed by the various 
States’: W R Moran Pty Ltd v Deputy Federal Commissioner of Taxation (NSW) (1940) 63 CLR 
338, 340–2 (Viscount Maugham for the Court) (‘Flour Tax Case (Privy Council)’). Hence, 
Tasmania enacted Tasmania Grant (Flour Tax) Act 1935 (Tas) to complement the 
Commonwealth Flour Tax (Wheat Industry Assistance) Assessment Act 1938 (Cth) and the 
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significantly minimise the role of Parliament in making and determining the 
scope of individual grants.153 This deprives states affected by such grants 
(either positively or negatively) from the ability to review and debate the 
impacts of those grants in the Senate.154 In a wider setting, Parliament as a 
whole loses its capacity to truly review and authorise the various purposes  
to which Commonwealth monies are expended. Such unfettered and 
unsupervised spending appears contrary to the structure and purpose of  
ch IV, as revealed by Pape and both Williams [No 1] and Williams [No 2]. 
C  The Meaning of ‘State’ 
Unlike the clear reference to the Parliament of the Commonwealth in s 96, the 
power to grant financial assistance ‘to any State’ is somewhat more obscure. 
On the one hand, ‘state’ might refer to the entire polity,155 arms of its 
government, or simply leave the matter to the internal constitutional 
arrangements in each state.156 
While the High Court has never clearly defined ‘state’ for the purposes of  
s 96, the orthodox cases seem to support the view that the mode and manner 
of acceptance of the monies is entirely a question of state, rather than 
Commonwealth, constitutional law. This also seems to be supported by a 
contextual reading of the Constitution, which consistently delineates between 
‘states’ simpliciter, and more specific arms of government of those states.157 
 
Flour Tax (Stocks) Act 1938 (Cth). In the First Uniform Tax Case (n 42) and Second Uniform 
Tax Case (n 38), the issue did not arise, but there was already a wide-ranging set of 
complementary state and Commonwealth Financial Agreement Acts passed, which allowed 
for the transfer of funds between the two polities, as well as administrative legislation to 
allow for its collection and distribution: see, eg, Income Tax (Commonwealth) Collection Act 
1923 (NSW). 
 153 Even at the time Saunders wrote, this was becoming evident: see Saunders, ‘Part 1’ (n 11). 
 154 See AAP Case (n 108) 358 (Barwick CJ). 
 155 Notably, s 96 does not contain the extra words ‘to one State or any part thereof ’ found in s 99 
of the Constitution (emphasis added). Those additional words describe the geographical 
aspects of the state, as opposed to the state as a governmental polity: see Fortescue Metals 
Group Ltd v Commonwealth (2013) 250 CLR 548, 591 [70] (Hayne, Bell and Keane JJ). 
 156 Saunders, ‘Part 1’ (n 11). Saunders’ view was that that the reference to the polity meant that 
‘section 96 should not be interpreted to compel the involvement of State Parliaments in the 
absence of an express requirement to that effect’, but should rather be left to ‘each State, in its 
Constitution or elsewhere, to prescribe how and by whom grants from the Commonwealth 
were to be accepted’: at 13. 
 157 Indeed, s 7 of the Constitution refers to the ‘Parliament of the State of Queensland, if that 
State be an Original State’ and s 10 refers to ‘Parliament’, ‘Parliament of the State’ and ‘State’ 
as three constitutionally distinct entities. See also Constitution ss 25, 30–1 (which distinguish 
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Indeed, the fact that s 96 so carefully specifies the Commonwealth Parliament, 
but does not do the same for the state, strengthens this view. That said, there 
seemed to be an early assumption, at least by the Privy Council, that on  
the state side: 
The [s 96] scheme admittedly could not have been carried out by the 
Commonwealth Parliament alone … [it relies upon] power … of the 
Tasmanian Parliament to distribute the financial assistance obtained from the 
Commonwealth in giving relief to persons within the State.158 
As explained above, much in that appeal could be so presumed, given the 
existence of a cooperative intergovernmental legislative regime to distribute 
grant monies.159 Neither the High Court nor the Privy Council therefore 
needed to consider the implications of grant monies not flowing through state 
consolidated revenue, much less the Commonwealth expressly or implicitly 
requiring them to do so. Nevertheless, some in the Court recognised that 
there must be limits on the use of Commonwealth power pursuant to s 96. 
Hence, in the Second Uniform Tax Case, Fullagar J reasoned that the terms 
and conditions of a tied grant could only demand ‘action of which the State is 
constitutionally capable’.160 Dixon CJ went further, concluding that the terms 
and conditions could not constitute a ‘special attempt to control the exercise 
of the constitutional powers of the States’.161 
Other members of the Court concluded that the voluntary nature of the 
impugned grants — the actual question the Court was asked to consider — 
were such that the state Parliament was not being directly controlled by  
the Commonwealth.162 Again, this leaves the question of whether ‘state’ in  
s 96 envisions a full polity, or merely an arm of it, very much open to  
debate. While it is not a debate which has been answered by more recent 
 
between the ‘Parliament of the State’ and the Commonwealth ‘Parliament’), s 95 (which 
distinguishes between ‘Parliament of the State of Western Australia’, ‘State’ and 
‘Commonwealth’), s 106–8 (which distinguish variously between ‘State’, ‘Parliament of the 
Commonwealth’ and ‘Parliament of the State’). Constitution s 109 describes ‘law of a State’, 
rather than law of the Parliament of a state, recognising that assent by the executive is 
necessary for valid enactment. Constitution ss 110, 119 refer separately to ‘state’ and 
‘government of the State’ or ‘Executive Government of the State’ respectively. 
 158 Flour Tax Case (Privy Council) (n 152) 341, 346 (Viscount Maugham for the Court) 
(emphasis added). 
 159 See above n 152. 
 160 Second Uniform Tax Case (n 38) 656. 
 161 Ibid 609. 
 162 Ibid 623 (McTiernan J), 636 (Williams J). 
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jurisprudence, echoes of the concerns raised by Fullagar J and Dixon CJ have 
continued. Hence, in the DOGS Case, Wilson J stated in obiter:  
The [s 96] legislation provides a striking contrast in the discretion that is 
accorded to the States in the administration of the grants for government 
schools and the virtually total disregard of the States, save only for the barest 
acknowledgement of the formalities required by s 96, in the administration of 
the grants for non-government schools. The contrast is all the more remarkable 
in the context of a constitution which in the distribution of power within the 
federation does not confer on the Commonwealth Parliament a specific 
legislative power with respect to education.163 
The issue was once again noted, but not dealt with directly, by the  
Court in ICM Agriculture. That case involved a regime in which states  
passed the money to recipients pursuant to a comprehensive legislative  
arrangement underpinned by a formal intergovernmental agreement.164  
The complementary state and Commonwealth legislative regime, inter-
governmental agreement and support for the regime by the New South Wales 
Government, was considered to impute sufficient consent by the State.165 
However, French CJ, Gummow and Crennan JJ noted that, in those 
circumstances, the correctness of less formal intergovernmental arrangements 
between state and Commonwealth governments pursuant to s 96 was 
‘unnecessary to consider’.166 This suggests that the level of formality in 
 
 163 DOGS Case (n 69) 659. According to Gibbs J, the orthodox interpretation was taken to mean 
that the states can be ‘no more than passive instruments by which the Commonwealth 
transmitted its moneys to the persons whom it had decided to assist’: at 590. In fact, the High 
Court appeared to have completely ignored (or possibly not considered) the existence of a 
pass-through agreement similar to that apparently used in the NAIF regime, albeit supported 
by a formal legislative framework at the state level. That is, perhaps, because the Court in that 
instance was not actually asked to revisit the question of states being used as financial 
conduits. 
 164 See the explanation of the relationship between the Water Management Act 2000 (NSW) and 
the Commonwealth legislation by French CJ, Gummow and Crennan JJ: ICM Agriculture  
(n 16) 160–3 [10]–[20]. 
 165 However, their Honours highlighted in obiter the use of ‘informal arrangement (in the  
form say of an exchange of letters) between governments setting out the conditions to be 
observed’ in some s 96 regimes: ICM Agriculture (n 16) 168 [37] (French CJ, Gummow and  
Crennan JJ), quoting Gilbert v Western Australia (1962) 107 CLR 494, 505 (Dixon CJ, Kitto 
and Windeyer JJ), quoting Letter from Prime Minister Robert Menzies to the Premier of 
Western Australia, 19 December 1951. 
 166 ICM Agriculture (n 16) 168 [38]. Hayne, Kiefel and Bell JJ considered the conduit and 
contract questions unnecessary to address at all: at 187 [106]. 
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intergovernmental agreements, particularly where they lack legislative 
support, remains open. 
The lack of clarity about the degree of state involvement required under  
s 96 has given rise to regimes like the NAIF, in which the Commonwealth 
contracts with State executives to act as a conduit of Commonwealth monies 
directly to private entities.167 Not only does this practically deny the character 
of the grant as one ‘to any State’, it also erodes the state Parliament’s 
supervisory role over state finances. 
It was a ‘basal assumption of legislative predominance inherited from the 
United Kingdom’168 that ‘the collection and expenditure of all revenue’169 by 
the executive of the colonies could only be done by ‘Grant of Parliament’170 
and ‘subject to law’.171 Hence, the constitutional principle in the colonies, 
which was carried into the law of the states, was that ‘it is essential to a 
complete parliamentary control of the public money that no portion of it 
should be arrested in its progress to the consolidated fund, from which alone 
it can be issued and applied with parliamentary sanction’.172 This includes 
grant income paid to the executive,173 not least because historically Crown 
borrowings were ‘often pledged against taxation revenues’,174 but also because 
 
 167 See, eg, NAIF Act (n 16); Investment Mandate (n 75). 
 168 Williams [No 1] (n 20) 232 [136] (Gummow and Bell JJ). 
 169 Luton v Lessels (2002) 210 CLR 333, 367 [100] (Kirby J). 
 170 Ibid 366 [99] (Kirby J). 
 171 Ibid 367 [100] (Kirby J). It is certainly not reserved to the sphere of the Commonwealth but 
is guaranteed by the Constitution in its establishment of the states and their Parliaments 
under ss 106–7. As the High Court explained in Egan v Willis (n 18), the principles of 
responsible government were embedded into the constitutional frameworks of the colonies 
prior to federation, and were reinforced as essential after their federation as states: at 453 [46] 
(Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ), 472–4 [94]–[97] (McHugh J). McHugh J further 
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government, no one now denies that [they received it]’: Egan v Willis (n 18) 473 [94]. 
 172 Commonwealth v Colonial Combing, Spinning and Weaving Co Ltd (1922) 31 CLR 421, 447 
(Isaacs J), citing Arthur James Vavasor Durell, The Principles and Practice of the System of 
Control over Parliamentary Grants (Gieves, 1917) 11. 
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consolidated revenues of the colonies, it is questionable whether that survived federation. It is 
also unlikely that financial transfer of aid to a state under the Constitution is technically the 
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allowing the Crown to receive and spend monies from unsupervised sources 
would allow it to exercise unconstrained financial powers.175 
The same constitutional principle that indicates that the Commonwealth 
Parliament must be involved in the granting of aid under s 96 also suggests 
that the state Parliaments must be involved in approving its incorporation into 
state revenue and expenditure to the purpose for which it is granted.176 
However, this is more than just a concern of state constitutional law. The 
Commonwealth cannot dispense with the law, including state law.177 Nor can 
it use its otherwise legitimate powers to interfere with the exercise of core 
state constitutional functions for which s 106 of the Constitution provides.178 
Thus, in Australian Railways Union v Victorian Railways Commissioners, 
Starke J concluded that 
the Constitutions of the States … prohibit moneys being taken out of the 
Consolidated Fund of the States (into which the revenues of the States are 
paid), except under a distinct authorization from the Parliaments of the  
States … It would require … the clearest words in the Constitution to [allow the 
Commonwealth to] interfere with or impair this constitutional principle, 
embedded in the Constitution of the States … in the absence of any such 
provision in the Constitution, [s] 106 is conclusive.179 
In New South Wales v Commonwealth [No 1], Rich and Dixon JJ took this 
principle to mean that, absent express constitutional mandate, the 
Commonwealth cannot ‘authorize the imposition upon the States of 
obligations which are not subject to the condition that funds shall be 
appropriated by the Parliaments of the States’.180 Consequently, it probably 
remains correct to say that s 96 refers to state as a polity, for contextual 
reasons alone, but also practical ones, insofar as it permits the Crown of each 
polity to reach cooperative agreements to transfer s 96 grant monies. 
 
 175 See Williams [No 1] (n 20) 232–3 [134]–[136] (Gummow and Bell JJ), 349–50 [509] 
(Crennan J). 
 176 See, eg, New South Wales v Commonwealth [No 1] (1932) 46 CLR 155, 176 (Rich and  
Dixon JJ) (‘NSW [No 1]’). 
 177 A v Hayden (1984) 156 CLR 532, 580 (Brennan J). This would undermine the separation of 
powers, as reflected by the ‘settled constitutional principle’ prohibiting executive 
dispensation of laws: Port of Portland Pty Ltd v Victoria (2010) 242 CLR 348, 359 [13] 
(French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Heydon, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ). See also Pape (n 86)  
87 [227] (Gummow, Crennan and Bell JJ). 
 178 Melbourne Corporation v Commonwealth (1947) 74 CLR 31, 75 (Starke J). 
 179 (1930) 44 CLR 319, 389. 
 180 NSW [No 1] (n 176) 176. 
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However, is a different thing altogether to say that s 96 permits the 
Commonwealth to set conditions or enter into agreements which are designed 
to bypass state parliamentary supervision of the grant monies once they are 
transferred to the state. 
That is especially the case, given that the source of Commonwealth power 
to enter into such agreements is now recognised to be found within s 51 
(operating incidentally to s 96) of the Constitution and arguably only once 
Parliament has approved the specific grant. That section must be read ‘subject 
to’ the requirement to maintain the constitutions of the states,181 which 
undeniably include the convention of responsible government and 
parliamentary supervision of public income and expenditure. 
D  Restrictions and Limitations 
Possibly the least justified but most problematic aspect of the orthodox 
interpretation of s 96 is its treatment as an island of power, unaffected by any 
other constitutional provisions. This historic view was also articulated by 
Starke J in the Flour Tax Case, in which his Honour asserted: 
This court has decided that grants of financial assistance to the States may be 
made on such terms and conditions as the Parliament thinks fit and are 
therefore unaffected by [s] 99 or any other provision of the Constitution.182 
Of course, to state that s 96 is not bound by a specific provision of the 
Constitution and ‘any other provision of the Constitution’ at the same time, is 
both tautological and redundant. Again, this appears to be the result of a 
misinterpretation of the Federal Roads Case by the later Court. Properly read, 
the High Court in the Federal Roads Case was clearly directing its conclusions 
to impugned legislation — finding that the Federal Aid Roads Act 1926 (Cth) 
itself was not restricted by s 99 or any other provision of the Constitution.183 
That is entirely different from saying s 96 is at sea from the larger 
constitutional text. In fact, when properly scrutinised, it is clear that neither 
proposition is correct. Each will be discussed below. 
 
 181 Constitution s 106. 
 182 Flour Tax Case (n 9) 771 (emphasis added), citing Federal Roads Case (n 8). 
 183 Federal Roads Case (n 8). 
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E  Section 96 is Not Unbounded 
Dealing with the broader of Starke J’s propositions first (that s 96 is unbound 
by ‘any other provision of the Constitution’),184 the High Court has, in fact, 
subsequently accepted that s 96 is limited by other constitutional provisions. 
The two most notable examples are the 1981 DOGS Case and the 2009 case of 
ICM Agriculture. In both cases, the majority accepted that s 96 could not be 
used to establish any religion or acquire property other than on just terms, 
due to the express limitations in s 116 and s 51(xxxi) of the Constitution 
respectively. Given the Court found in both cases that the impugned 
legislation did not breach those constitutional provisions, there was no reason 
for the Court to direct its attention to how its acceptance of these restrictions 
on s 96 aligned or conflicted with Starke J’s orthodox interpretation. On the 
other hand, nothing in the conclusions reached in either case indicates that 
those two constitutional freedoms are exceptions to a general rule that s 96 is 
not bound by other provisions of the Constitution.185 
Indeed, the conclusion about the scope and limitations of s 96 reached in 
Williams [No 2] — that it must ‘be decided in light of all of the relevant 
provisions of the Constitution’186 — necessarily requires that it conform to the 
general limitations on Commonwealth spending powers. However, the 
reintegration of s 96 goes further than that, especially in recognising that it is 
a financial, rather than legislative, power. This means it is reliant upon the 
incidental power — probably s 51(xxxvi) — to properly legislate. 
As French CJ stated in the majority in Rowe v Electoral Commissioner,  
s 51(xxxvi) is the same as ‘every power conferred by s 51’, insofar as it must 
necessarily be read ‘subject to the limitations imposed by the Constitution’.187 
Hayne J (in dissent) agreed, accepting that the legislative power granted by  
s 51(xxxvi) is valid ‘[u]ntil the Parliament otherwise provides, but subject to 
this Constitution’.188 When considered specifically in relation to s 96, it is 
therefore clear that the Commonwealth has power to make tied grants, but 
 
 184 Flour Tax Case (n 9) 771. 
 185 There would seem little doubt, for instance, that tied grants could not be used to support 
schemes that undermined state or federal courts in breach of ch III of the Constitution or 
which breach the implied freedom of political communication. That is most obvious because 
both of those freedoms apply to state and Commonwealth alike, but it is also inherent in the 
characterisation of the power under s 96 itself. 
 186 Williams [No 2] (n 101) 469 [82] (French CJ, Hayne, Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ) (emphasis 
altered). 
 187 Rowe v Electoral Commissioner (2010) 243 CLR 1, 14 [8]. 
 188 Ibid 65 [183], quoting Constitution ss 10, 31. 
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this power is subject to the Constitution, not free of it. All of this strongly 
suggests that any assumption that s 96 is unbound by ‘any other provision of 
the Constitution’189 is an unconvincing and untenable position. 
1 Section 99 Does Not Create a Positive Prohibition or Restriction on s 96 
If it is incorrect to assume that s 96 is free of constitutional limitations and 
constraints generally, then all that remains of this aspect of the orthodoxy is 
Latham CJ’s primary assertion — that the provision is not ‘affected by …  
[s] 99’ specifically.190 That provision states: 
The Commonwealth shall not, by any law or regulation of trade, commerce, or 
revenue, give preference to one State or any part thereof over another State or 
any part thereof.191 
The orthodox interpretation of s 96 assumes that the restrictions found in s 99 
are addressed to the same category of Commonwealth activity that s 96 
permits.192 Thus, the reasoning goes, the former could not have been intended 
to apply to the latter because it would render the tied grants power 
inoperative. This was explained by Latham CJ in the Flour Tax Case — in 
reliance on the earlier judgment of the Federal Roads Case — as follows: 
[Section] 96 is a means provided by the Constitution which enables the 
Commonwealth Parliament, when it thinks proper, to adjust inequalities 
between States which may arise from the application of uniform non-
discriminating Federal laws to States which vary in development and wealth. … 
[T]hese ‘equal’ laws may produce very unequal results in different parts of 
Australia. A uniform law may confer benefits upon some States, but it may so 
operate as to amount to what is called ‘a Federal disability’ in other States. 
 
 189 Flour Tax Case (n 9) 771 (Starke J), citing Federal Roads Case (n 8). 
 190 Flour Tax Case (n 9) 763 (emphasis added), quoting Federal Roads Case (n 8) 406 (Knox CJ 
for the Court). 
 191 Constitution s 99. 
 192 In Morgan v Commonwealth (1947) 74 CLR 421 (‘Morgan’), the post-Engineers’ Case (n 4) 
Court, in a strangely constructivist reading of the Constitution, determined that s 99 is 
limited to laws made pursuant to s 51(i), despite the section not actually saying that. 
However, this restriction appears to have been rejected by the High Court in Permanent 
Trustee v Commissioner of State Revenue (Vic) (2004) 220 CLR 388, which accepted the 
submission that ‘the prohibition in s 99 is not limited to laws supported by s 51(ii) of the 
Constitution’: at 422 (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Callinan and Heydon JJ); and that ‘there 
is no reason to restrict s 99 in such a fashion as would deny [a law] the character of a law of 
“revenue” by reason of its source in s 52(i) rather than s 51(ii) of the Constitution’:  
at 422 [84] (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Callinan and Heydon JJ) (‘Mirror Tax Case’). 
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[Section] 96 provides means for adjusting such inequalities in accordance with 
the judgment of Parliament.193 
It is worth noting that this interpretation accords with historical scholarship 
about the original intention for the section.194 Specifically, that it was designed 
to allay concerns about the ‘financial disruption to the States consequent upon 
Federation’,195 by ensuring that the Commonwealth had the capacity to 
indemnify them against the impact of the ‘operation of uniform duties of 
customs and excise’.196 Of course, the orthodoxy reinterprets that purpose as 
being one which applies beyond the period of financial restructuring 
following federation, but that accords to the modern view of s 96 as a 
permanent constitutional fixture. To that extent, the orthodox interpretation 
remains correct. Where it is less compelling is in its conflation of the topic and 
purpose of s 96 and s 99. While this is not made evident by recent federal 
fiscal case law, it is revealed by recent law that revives dissenting views on the 
roles of both these provisions, especially that of Evatt J in both Elliott v 
Commonwealth (‘Elliott’)197 and the Flour Tax Case itself. 
As Dixon J noted in dissent in Elliott, it is a mistake to treat 
‘discrimination’ and ‘preference’ as being ‘identical in meaning’.198 Evatt J, also 
in dissent in that case, agreed, and after a textual exegesis of s 99 concluded: 
To prove infringement of [s] 99 it is not sufficient to show discrimination based 
on mere locality; it must also be shown that, as a consequence of the 
discrimination, tangible benefits, advantages, facilities or immunities are given 
to persons or corporations …  
… [F]or the purpose of determining two distinct questions: first, whether, 
solely as a result of their operation, tangible benefits, advantages, facilities or 
immunities accrue to any persons or class of persons; second, whether such 
accrual is a consequence of geographical situation … regardless of all other 
circumstances.199 
 
 193 Flour Tax Case (n 9) 763–4. 
 194 See Taylor (n 6) 1462–3. 
 195 Ibid 1446. 
 196 Official Record of the Debates of the Federal Council of Australasia, Melbourne, 25 January 
1899, 19 (Sir James Dickson), quoting Letter from Sir Samuel Griffith to Sir James Dickson, 
23 January 1899. 
 197 Elliott v Commonwealth (1936) 54 CLR 657. 
 198 Ibid 683. 
 199 Ibid 693 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
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This test, and the reasoning which supported it, was revived and approved by 
the majority of the High Court in the 2004 case of Permanent Trustee v 
Commissioner of State Revenue (Vic),200 indicating that it is now the correct 
test. The acceptance of Evatt J’s reasoning by the modern Court — especially 
his Honour’s exegesis of the meaning and purpose of s 99 — is particularly 
relevant to its interaction with s 96, given his Honour would go on to cite his 
reasoning in Elliott to justify his dissent about how those two powers 
interacted in the Flour Tax Case. In the Flour Tax Case, his Honour  
concluded that 
[s] 96 cannot be employed for the very purpose of nullifying constitutional 
guarantees contained elsewhere in the Constitution … [It] could not be 
contended that … in face of [s] 99, which precludes the Commonwealth from 
enacting commercial laws which give a preference to one State over another, the 
Commonwealth could grant moneys to one State for the express purpose of 
enabling that State to subsidise traders engaged in inter-State trade on 
condition that they resided in such a State …201 
As Evatt J observed, any apparent orthodoxy surrounding s 96 and s 99  
was based on obiter at best.202 More to the point, his Honour’s judgment 
highlighted that the two sections are directed to different forms  
of discrimination: 
• s 96 permits the Commonwealth to correct an inequality; and 
• s 99 prohibits the Commonwealth from creating an inequality.203 
That is, the former allows the raising of a benchmark; the latter prohibits 
creating differential benchmarks. They operate on similar subjects in 
dissimilar forms such that, while s 99 might constrain the scope of s 96, it 
does not create a positive prohibition or restriction on its ordinary operation 
that would serve to nullify it completely.204 On appeal, the Privy Council 
 
 200 Mirror Tax Case (n 192) 423 [87]–[88] (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Callinan and  
Heydon JJ), 446 [155] (McHugh J), 465 [224] (Kirby J). 
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at 767–70 (Starke J). 
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see also at 763–4 (Latham CJ). 
 204 See Work Choices Case (n 4) 127 [219] (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Heydon and  
Crennan JJ). 
2018]    (Re)Interpreting Section 96 in Light of Fiscal Federalism 497 
agreed with Evatt J’s dissent in law — in contradistinction to the majority and 
especially Latham CJ — but not in its application to the specific facts of that 
case, upholding the majority’s decision ‘using the language of caution’ in 
relation to its interpretation of s 96 generally.205 That caution (about the 
assumption s 96 may be used to discriminate generally), along with the 
endorsement of Evatt J’s views when combined with the contemporary 
acceptance of his Honour’s dissenting views on the role and purpose of s 99 
more generally, strongly suggest that his views on the intersection of the two 
provisions is the proper one.206 By consequence the entirety of the orthodoxy 
which treats the section as an unassailable island of spending power must be 
incorrect. 
V  R E M A P P I N G  S  96 
What is set out above suggests that the treatment of s 96 as having ‘no 
judicially enforceable limits’207 is unjustified and contrary to our 
contemporary understanding of the Constitution and its interpretation. 
Indeed, each of the specific conclusions that have been reached as a 
consequence of that broader orthodox view also appear incorrect. Namely, 
that the Parliaments play a nominal role; that the power may be delegated; or 
that the subject of the grant and its terms and conditions are unaffected by 
other constitutional limitations. However, it is worth pausing to recognise the 
disconnect between identifying errors on principle — even the most 
 
 205 Flour Tax Case (Privy Council) (n 152) 350 (Viscount Maugham for the Court). Their 
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carry it into effect, in so far as that attack is really based on the exercise by the 
Commonwealth Parliament of its powers under [s] 96. Those powers are plainly being 
used for the purpose of preventing an unfairness or injustice to the State of Tasmania … 
[However,] [t]heir Lordships are using the language of caution … They will add only that, 
in the view they take of the matter some of the legislative expedients — objected to as 
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fundamental principles — and predicting the correction of those errors by the 
High Court.208 As French CJ summarised in Wurridjal v Commonwealth: 
In many cases of interpretation of the Constitution, constructional choices are 
presented. To say that, upon a consideration of text, context, history and 
attributed purpose, one choice is to be preferred to another, is not necessarily to 
say that the choice rejected is wrong. Reasonable minds may differ on a point of 
constitutional interpretation.209 
It might be added that when presented with alternative constructional 
choices, the decision to maintain the status quo is not wrong either. In fact, 
there is much to be said about maintaining a consistent line of interpretative 
precedent. While the doctrine of stare decisis may not strictly apply to the 
Constitution, the High Court prefers to maintain a stable and consistent line 
of interpretative authority, and views overturning earlier decisions as a 
‘serious step, not lightly to be undertaken’.210 This is not to say we should 
ignore questionable precedent, or suggest how the Court might correct it, but 
it does suggest that these questions should be approached with some degree of 
conservatism, objectivity and balance. 
The fact that the s 96 orthodoxy has remained untouched for close to a 
century could mean that the Court is cautious about destabilising such a 
longstanding (perceived or actual) precedent. That is especially the case given 
how central the orthodoxy has become to the Commonwealth’s oversight of 
national economic affairs, infrastructure, public and community projects.211 
The existence of these regimes and the rights they confer on citizens and states 
militates against overturning the decisions that they ostensibly rely upon for 
their validity.212 
On the other hand, a range of indicia suggest the Court might be willing to 
overturn the orthodoxy.213 Notable is the fact that, properly considered, the 
orthodoxy does not appear to be based on ‘a principle carefully worked out in 
 
 208 See, eg, Stephen Gageler and Brendan Lim, ‘Collective Irrationality and the Doctrine of 
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 213 John v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1989) 166 CLR 417, 438–9 (Mason CJ, Wilson, 
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a significant succession of cases’.214 While it is true that there are four cases 
(three cases if the First Uniform Tax Case and the Second Uniform Tax Case 
are viewed together in respect of s 96 of the Constitution) that could be said to 
form the basis of the orthodoxy,215 only the First Uniform Tax Case actually 
dealt with s 96 directly; the latter cases considered a narrow point, and in 
doing so reinforced that there was a limit to s 96, rather than denying it (the 
need for state consent).216 The second of the cases, the Flour Tax Case, 
admittedly did deal with s 96 directly, but included a ‘forcible dissenting 
judgment’ by Evatt J, which was expressly endorsed by the Privy Council and 
appears to have been further endorsed by modern courts — albeit 
indirectly.217 More problematic though was the fact that the majority in the 
Flour Tax Case justified their conclusions based on a highly questionable 
(mis)interpretation of the first Federal Roads Case as being of general 
relevance, or indeed any relevance at all. The fact that the whole structure of 
the orthodoxy is founded on such an insubstantial, and arguably per incuriam 
judgment as the Federal Roads Case is, of itself, a justification for revisiting 
it.218 The stability of the orthodoxy is in fact much further ‘“weakened” by 
subsequent decisions [and] in the light of experience’, which is itself indicia 
for overturning (perceived or actual) precedent.219 Indeed, the Court has 
already begun to tear down the orthodoxy, admittedly by incident, but in 
significant ways. Most notable is the acceptance that the provision is subject to 
constitutional limitations.220 It has also asserted that the section sits within, 
rather than outside of, ch IV as a financial, rather than legislative, power.221 In 
doing so, the orthodoxy has been revealed to be out of step with our evolving 
understanding of the Constitution and ‘incompatible with the ongoing 
development of constitutional jurisprudence’ relating to fiscal federalism.222 
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500 Melbourne University Law Review [Vol 42(2):455 
The Court has pointed to these indicia as justification for overturning (real 
or perceived) precedent.223 The quantum of them suggest the Court is likely  
to be receptive to a challenge against s 96 orthodoxy.224 Indeed, if either 
Williams [No 1] or Williams [No 2] is anything to go by, the fact that the s 96 
orthodoxy has remained untouched for close to a century may not engender 
caution and conservatism in the Court at all. Section 96 very much seems to 
be the final island of financial power to be unexplored by the modern Court 
in its exegesis of ch IV. Reflections on the progressive enlargement of the 
Commonwealth’s executive power by consequence of the absence of any 
challenge for almost a century are self-evident. Indeed, it should be 
remembered that much of what has been considered to be part of the 
apparent orthodoxy does not arise out of the Court’s actual ratio, but  
through increasingly liberal interpretations of it and obiter dicta by the 
Commonwealth.225 The Court might consider that it does not so much have to 
overturn historic precedent as to distinguish it and confirm the applicability 
of its more recent incidental decisions to the provision specifically. 
A  What Would a Remapped s 96 Look Like? 
While it is not entirely possible to say what the Court might replace the 
orthodoxy with, or how far it might go to limit the provision to its 
constitutional confines and original purpose, there are several incidental 
indicators that the role of the Parliaments might take a more prominent place 
in its interpretation. What is relatively clear is that, if the Court is to finalise its 
restructuring of ch IV in relation to the rest of the Constitution, s 96 will need 
to be provided a meaningful and functional role within it; assuming that it is 
not a ‘spent provision’ and will not be terminated as it was intended.226 Both 
Williams [No 1] and Williams [No 2], in particular, indicate that such a 
meaningful reintegration will involve further clarifying its role as the proper 
conduit of public monies between each of the federal polities. That seems to 
demand much greater involvement of the Parliaments of each polity. For the 
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reasons set out it also brings into serious question the ability of the bare 
spending power in s 96 to be delegated to the executive to determine the 
nature, recipient, terms and conditions of grants. 
As the Parliaments have no juristic personality, it may be necessarily 
implied that their respective Crowns must conduct negotiations pursuant to  
s 96. If it is to be further assumed that the purpose of s 96 is to correct 
disabilities resulting from uniform Commonwealth laws, it might be expected 
that the state executive leads this process via a formal request of grant monies, 
rather than the other way around. 
It would also seem that any negotiated intergovernmental agreement 
cannot be constructed in such a way that requires the state to bypass 
fundamental constitutional protections — especially the supervisory role of its 
Parliament. It is also a necessary conclusion that an agreement negotiated by 
executives cannot bind the Parliaments of the states or the Commonwealth, 
until they have properly consented to it. Simply, the executives of each polity 
may negotiate s 96 intergovernmental agreements, but not give them the force 
of law without Parliamentary endorsement. Analogously, the Commonwealth 
executive is the only body capable of negotiating treaties,227 the conclusion of 
which gives rise to the factum necessary to enliven the legislative power under 
s 51(xxix). Yet, the existence and scope of any delegated power to administer 
that agreement domestically is contingent upon Parliament selecting and 
legislating the terms and conditions of that external agreement it wishes to put 
into effect.228 
In fact, it was the understanding of the founders that the Commonwealth 
and states would each, ‘within the ambit of its authority, [be] a sovereign 
State’.229 While it has subsequently become clear that neither are technically 
sovereign, the procedure envisioned by s 96 appears to retain the view of each 
as autonomous entities negotiating a treaty of financial aid. It also accords 
with the early procedure for s 96 tied grants (including the regimes in the 
Federal Roads Case and Flour Tax Case), which involved the scheduling and 
incorporation of intergovernmental agreements into legislation by Parliament. 
The abandonment of such a procedure in contemporary regimes — in which 
the Commonwealth unilaterally legislates to vest power in an executive body 
to conclude such agreements with binding force — is constitutionally 
questionable. The equivalent with respect to the treaties power would be for 
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legislation, made ostensibly under s 51(xxix), to automatically incorporate any 
international agreement negotiated by the executive into domestic law. That 
cannot be the case in a dualist system, where Parliament is responsible for 
making the law, just as it is responsible for approving the expenditure of 
money on grants to the states. 
A further two points need to be made about any legislation authorising 
and incorporating an intergovernmental agreement to establish a s 96 tied 
grant. The first is that, as discussed, a state executive cannot, by agreement or 
otherwise, bind its Parliament to exercise its constitutional powers of financial 
supervision or control.230 Thus, Commonwealth s 96 legislation that 
incorporates an intergovernmental agreement cannot rely on that agreement 
as state consent per se. Rather, Commonwealth legislation would seem to 
require an external trigger to commence: namely, the enactment of 
complementary legislation by the state. After that time, however, the state 
becomes bound as a matter of Commonwealth administrative law, rather than 
contract law — resolving at least part of the uncertainty as to whether the 
state executive can bind its own legislature by contract. 
The second point depends on whether it is assumed that s 96 remains 
directed only to correcting federal disabilities. Neither the Court in Pape nor 
Williams [No 1] nor Williams [No 2] suggested that should be the case. On the 
other hand, that was clearly the intention of the drafters and, perhaps 
surprisingly, confirmed as the true character and purpose of the section by the 
orthodox Court.231 If that is the case, a question arises as to whether either an 
intergovernmental s 96 agreement or incorporating legislation needs to 
actually identify the federal disability it is designed to correct — and, 
incidentally, whether that should be a justiciable issue at all. Both questions 
can, in fact, be resolved in a political, if not legal, sense, so long as the 
intergovernmental agreement is placed before the Houses and approved 
through the ordinary legislative process. Doing so ensures that any potential 
that the resultant legislation creates unjustified discrimination or preference is 
considered by state senators. Ultimately, this reinforces the need for s 96 
agreements to be negotiated and approved in a treaty-like process. 
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VI  C O N C LU SI O N  
On appeal from the High Court’s decision in the Flour Tax Case, the Privy 
Council observed: ‘The separate parts of a machine have little meaning if 
examined without reference to the function they will discharge in the 
machine.’232 This aspect of the Privy Council’s judgment was restricted to the 
cooperative state and Commonwealth legislative regime before them. Their 
Lordships’ rejection of arguments that did not take into account the ‘organic 
whole’ of the regime.233 While the statement could well have been an 
indictment on the High Court’s failure to directly consider the regime’s 
ostensible reliance upon s 96, the Privy Council did not go so far. That was, in 
part, because of the narrow legal questions placed before it, and their 
Lordships’ ‘caution’ about ‘dealing with constitutional matters to decide no 
more than their duty requires’.234 The result was to leave undisturbed an 
interpretation of s 96 that was made without reference to the organic whole of 
the Constitution, nor the specific function it was supposed to discharge. The 
result, most agree,235 is that the section is not operating as it was intended: 
indeed, it is arguable that its operation is undermining, rather than 
contributing to, the efficient operation of the federal fiscal machinery of the 
Constitution. If a machine’s components are not operating as they are 
supposed to, they need to be repaired or replaced. 
Contemporary High Court federal fiscal jurisprudence reveals that the 
orthodoxy’s singular and myopic interpretative approach is the source of the 
‘fundamental problems’ with s 96.236 It led to the assumption that it is a 
legislative power to spend, without any restrictions, on any subject matter the 
Commonwealth Parliament — or bodies it has delegated its authority to — 
determines. The grant could then be awarded to non-state entities with 
nominal involvement of the states and their Parliaments. That is a surprising 
conclusion in a federal system, underpinned by representative and responsible 
government and bound by the rule of law. Perhaps this is because it is a 
conclusion that can only be reached by ignoring that system altogether. The 
modern Court has warned against doing that and expanded the Privy 
Council’s contextual interpretation beyond financial statutes to the 
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constitutional provisions they rely upon. In fact, in ICM Agriculture, the 
Court urged us to take account of ‘developments in interpretation of the 
Constitution’237 and look ‘beyond matters of legal form’ in our understanding 
of the role and functions of the various provisions of ch IV.238 
Interpreting s 96 in light of the wider constitutional framework, and the 
financial machinery in which it is found, indicates that Parliament must have 
a much more dominant role in granting aid to states than it has to date. This is 
not a role that can be delegated until the decision to make a grant and a 
decision to set the terms and conditions has been made by Parliament. This is, 
in part, because the provision is properly seen as a bare financial power, but 
especially because the High Court has asserted that its function is one which 
guarantees legislative control of financial transfers to the states. To an extent, 
the High Court has bound itself to that position by asserting in Williams  
[No 1] and Williams [No 2] that Commonwealth spending outside of its heads 
of power must occur via the conduit of s 96, because that provision guarantees 
Senate oversight. Allowing the executive to determine individual grants and 
their terms and conditions without effective parliamentary oversight  
under the very same provision would, to use the words of Hayne J, render  
s 96 ‘otiose’.239 
While the relevance of the federal fiscal cases for state constitutions is less 
than clear, the contextual reading of ch IV suggests that there is a similar 
obligation for state parliamentary involvement in the receipt and approval of  
s 96 grants. This may have some impacts on the Commonwealth’s ability  
to spend on anything it chooses, but it is unlikely to bring our national 
financial system grinding to a halt. There is no little irony that the early s 96 
tied grant regimes, which led to the orthodoxy, were actually premised  
on complementary and cooperative state and commonwealth legislative 
regimes — showing that it is possible for the section to function in that way. 
Equally pertinent is the fact that none of the predicted national financial 
disasters arising from the Williams [No 1] and Williams [No 2] limitation on 
unrestrained Commonwealth spending eventuated. Our constitutional system 
is robust and capable of dealing with national contingencies, especially when 
cooperative governance is utilised as it was designed to be. More to the point, 
meaningfully reintegrating a provision cast adrift from the constitutional 
continent would continue the Court’s ongoing efforts to clarify the text and 
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structure of the Constitution, the rule of law that underpins it, and the federal 
arrangements that it establishes.240 
It is true that the critique and questions of Saunders and others have gone 
unanswered for too long. However, it is important to note that the pause has 
allowed the Court to significantly advance our understanding of the 
Constitution, including the Chapter in which s 96 is found. It has also allowed 
the dissatisfaction with the provision to migrate from journals such as this 
into the public domain, where it is more likely to give rise to a direct assault 
on the orthodoxy that has developed around it. While the rate of change to 
the interpretation of s 96 may seem glacial to some, it should not be assumed 
that it is frozen. Glaciers may take time to shift continents, but when they do, 
the effects can be dramatic. 
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